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The Causal Effect of Education on Wages Revisited
* 
 
This paper estimates the return to education using two alternative instrumental variable 
estimators: one exploits variation in schooling associated with early smoking behaviour, the 
other uses the raising of the minimum school leaving age. Each instrument estimates a ‘local 
average treatment effect’ and my motivation is to analyse the extent to which these differ and 
which is more appropriate for drawing conclusions about the return to education in Britain. I 
implement each instrument on the same data from the British Household Panel Survey, and 
use the over-identification to test the validity of my instruments. I find that the instrument 
constructed using early smoking behaviour is valid as well as being strong, and argue that it 
provides a better estimate of the average effect of additional education, akin to ordinary least 
squares but corrected for endogeneity. I also exploit the dual sources of exogenous variation 
in schooling to derive a further IV estimate of the return to schooling. I find the OLS estimate 
to be considerably downward biased (around 4.6%) compared with the IV estimates of 12.9% 
(early smoking), 10.2% (RoSLA) and 12.5% (both instruments). 
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for Market and Public Organisation. 1 Introduction
This paper estimates the causal eﬀect of education on wages using two alternative methods
of instrumentation. I compare estimates that are derived using variations in schooling as-
sociated with early smoking behaviour, with estimates derived by exploiting the impact on
schooling of the raising of the minimum school leaving age. The latter instrument follows in
the tradition of Card (1995) and similar papers1, which use institutional factors or elements
of the budget constraint to create instruments. This earlier research using instrumental vari-
able methods covers a wide range and my work here is motivated by the worry that these
instrumental variable methods identify a ‘local average treatment eﬀect’ which might be
rather diﬀerent to the average eﬀect on the treated and that will diﬀer across instruments.
These IV estimates isolate the return to education for the group whose education decision
is most aﬀected by the institutional feature exploited or the change in their own budget
constraint, which may be quite a speciﬁc and unrepresentative group. The raising of the
minimum school leaving age aﬀected only those who that had wanted to leave school early
and therefore, in this case, IV estimates the eﬀect of additional schooling for those at the
bottom of the schooling distribution who were forced to stay longer. In contrast, I ﬁnd that
early smoking aﬀects the schooling decisions of individuals across the whole of the distribu-
tion – that is, it is not only individuals at a certain point in the schooling distribution who
are aﬀected. I interpret the estimates from this latter exercise as closer to an average eﬀect of
additional schooling akin to least squares but corrected for endogeneity. My contribution is
to investigate the extent to which this eﬀect diﬀers from the local eﬀect at the bottom of the
distribution, implementing the alternative instrumental variables strategies using that same
data from the British Household Panel Survey. In addition, as I have multiple instruments I
am able to test the validity of the exclusion restrictions, something that is rarely possible to
do, and also to simultaneously exploit two diﬀering sources of exogenous variation in order
1The ﬁrst notable paper to use instrumental variables to estimate the return to education was Angrist
and Krueger (1991). A UK study by Harmon and Walker (1995 inter alia) also exploited the minimum
school leaving age change.
1to derive a further estimate of the return to education. The next section introduces the
problem of estimating the return to education, section 3 then discusses potential solutions.
Section 4 proposes early smoking as an instrument for education, before section 5 describes
the data. Section 6 explains the estimation procedure, section 7 the results and section 8
analyses these results and considers various tests of the instrument. Section 9 then compares
the smoking instrument estimates with ones derived from the raising of the school leaving
age, before section 10 exploits the presence of two instruments to formally test the validity
of these instruments. Section 11 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The Problem of Estimating the Return to Education




iϕ + βSi + ǫi (1)
in which wi is the wage, Xi is a vector of the individual’s characteristics, including experience
and experience-squared, and Si is the number of years of schooling, determined by:
Si = X
′
iγ + ui (2)
This human capital earnings function tells us the expected (log) wage that an individual
will earn given his/her observable characteristics and years of education. It is well known that
if this relationship in equation (1) is estimated by least squares the estimate of the parameter
β can only be interpretable as the causal eﬀect on wages of one additional year of schooling
if E(Xi ǫi) = 0 and E(Si ǫi) = 0. If however E(Si ǫi)  = 0, though we can still interpret the
equation as the conditional expectation of ln wi given Xi and Si, we cannot interpret β as the
causal eﬀect of education on wages since education is endogenous with respect to the causal
eﬀect β. The potential for the unobserved characteristics that determine schooling choice to
also be correlated with wage, has for a long time been a concern to labour economists. If
we are to draw valid conclusions regarding the economic return to education we must isolate
2the causal eﬀect of education on wages. Clearly this is not straightforward because of this
concern: we anticipate that factors aﬀecting the education choice an individual makes will
also independently aﬀect their earned wage, we expect E(ui ǫi)  = 0.
Earlier research concentrated on the issue of ‘ability bias’ which suggested that E(Si ǫi) > 0
because the residual picks up ability which is positively correlated with both wages and
schooling. This ability bias explanation suggested that OLS was unambiguously biased
upwards. In contrast, in his inﬂuential paper of 1977, Griliches proposed that measure-
ment error in the schooling variable would lead to an attenuation of the OLS coeﬃcient
on schooling, biasing it towards zero. Griliches concluded that ‘ability bias’ was in reality
small and was overwhelmed by the bias introduced by measurement error, with the result
that OLS under-estimated the actual return to education. Card (1994) reported that in the
micro-survey data commonly used by labour economists, measurement error in the schooling
variable accounts for approximately 10 percent of the variance in observed schooling. This
would lead to a 10 percent attenuation bias in the OLS coeﬃcient – and even more if other
covariates in the regression are correlated with the real level of schooling (Card, 1994). This
estimate of around 10% concurs with evidence from Ashenfelter and Kreuger (1995) (using
data from twins and reporting the measurement error to be between 8% and 12%), and
furthermore, studies in which the education variable is deemed to be much more reliably
measured (for example Uusitalo (1999), in which the schooling information comes directly
from school records) still ﬁnd the IV estimates to be considerably higher than the OLS.
At the start of the 1990s, a number of economists suggested that OLS estimates of the
return to education may suﬀer from a further bias – ‘discount rate bias’ (see Lang, 1993;
Card, 1994). In Becker’s model of human capital formation, with standard assumptions2,
an individual will accumulate human capital to the point where the marginal rate of return
on the last unit of education is equal to his/her discount rate. To illustrate this: (see Kling
2i) workers maximize the discounted present value of lifetime wealth; ii) time in school is independent of
time in work, or alternatively lifetimes are inﬁnitely lived; iii) there are no direct costs of education; iv) the
eﬀect of experience on earnings is multiplicative.
32000) assume that the individual’s earnings opportunities are summarized by the function
y=g(S) which speciﬁes the earnings available for each level of education, S. Further assume
that individuals earn nothing whilst in school, and discount the future at a constant rate
r. Then in deciding upon the level of education to acquire, individuals will maximise the








As standard in the literature, taking the log of this to be the individual’s utility function
over (S), having substituted y out of the utility function, gives:
U
∗(S) = log(g(S)) − rS − log(r) ≡ log(g(S)) − φ(S) (4)
where φ(S) = log(r)+rS. The optimal level of schooling is determined where the marginal
beneﬁt of an additional year of schooling is equal to the marginal cost, which is explicit in








If we further assume that g(S) is log-concave then this solution equates the marginal rate
of return to schooling with the individual’s discount rate.
An individual’s discount rate reﬂects both his/her access to ﬁnance to fund current
investment in education whilst deferring earnings and also his/her rate of time preference.
If individuals diﬀer in their preferences and in their ﬁnancial resources, this will result in
diﬀerent discount rates and lead to variation in the point at which they stop acquiring
education – a higher discount rate resulting in a lower optimal level of education. Therefore
schooling level choice may diﬀer amongst individuals of the same ability because of diﬀerences
in individual discount rates (Lang, 1993). The natural question to ask is: what eﬀect will
discount rate variation have on the OLS estimates of the return to schooling – does the
unobserved discount rate that aﬀects education also aﬀect wages?
Intuition tells us that there is reason to believe that it might. It could be the case
that individuals who have a higher discount rate because of their rate of time preference,
4have more ambition or determination to get into the labour market and earn money. This
drive is rewarded in higher wages and also these individuals are more likely to choose career
paths with steep wage curves. Consequently a higher discount rate is associated with lower
education but also a higher wage controlling for education, thus E(ui ǫi) < 0. In this case
the OLS estimation of the return to education is negatively biased. However, it may be that
the opposite is true: Munasinghe and Sicherman (2000) present strong evidence from the
NLSY3 that smoking can proxy for rate of time preference, and that after controlling for a
rich set of covariates, smokers (high discount rate individuals) experience lower initial wages
and lower wage growth than non-smokers (low discount rate), which would suggest that high
discount rate individuals are not selecting into steep wage growth occupations. If the wages
of high discount rate individuals are lower (conditional on education) and grow more slowly
then OLS estimates will be upward biased.
Discount rate and ability are both sources of variation in levels of schooling, moreover
these two sources of variation interact in a complex way. Momentarily ignoring the demo-
graphic and background characteristics in X that aﬀect schooling, the demand for schooling
function is S=S(a,r): schooling level choice depends positively on the individual’s innate
ability (a) and negatively on their discount rate (r). We can invert this function to get
innate ability as a function of schooling and the discount rate: a=a(S,r). So “...even if
the discount rate and innate ability are uncorrelated, they are correlated once we condition
on the level of schooling. For a given level of schooling, individuals with higher discount
rates will have more innate ability” (Lang, 1993, p10). While a higher discount rate reduces
an individual’s level of schooling, when we hold that level of schooling constant, those with
higher discount rates will have higher ability and this will be rewarded with a higher wage.
Recalling the model, this makes sense: we know that if two individuals have chosen the same
level of schooling it means that for each, at that point, the marginal return to schooling is
equal to their discount rate. Thus the individual with the higher discount rate has a higher
3National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, US data
5marginal return at that level of education, indicating that they have higher ability. There-
fore a higher value of discount rate will reduce schooling, but conditional on schooling in
the wage equation, a higher discount rate will mean higher ability and a higher wage: thus
E(ui ǫi) < 0. Therefore this potential mechanism through which discount rate aﬀects the
joint process of education and earnings again suggests a negative bias in the OLS estimates.
If both ability bias and discount rate bias aﬀect the OLS estimate of the return to education
but work in opposite directions, then a priori we cannot determine what the net bias in the
coeﬃcients will be. It is possible that the OLS is higher or lower than the ‘true’ return to
education.
3 Solving the Endogeneity Problem
Over many years, economists have attempted solve the problem of the endogeneity of edu-
cation in a number of ways. Firstly, a number of studies attempt to control for the eﬀect of
ability bias directly by including measures of ability such as IQ and other test scores in the
model. However, aside from concerns over whether these types of variables are a good proxy
for wage earning ability, Lang (1993) demonstrates that depending on the functional form
chosen for the earnings equation, adding ‘ability’ variables to the model may not necessar-
ily improve their explanatory power and in fact may result in perverse signs for the these
variables. The variety of ﬁndings in the empirical literature (see Lang, 1993) for the signs
and signiﬁcance of these variables justiﬁed Lang’s concerns. Moreover this ‘ability’ variable
‘solution’ does nothing to counter problem of discount rate bias.
Another approach is to use twins or siblings and exploit diﬀerences in their education
levels and earnings under the assumption that using twins (especially identical twins) or
siblings, eliminates diﬀerences in innate ability, and provides an unbiased estimator of the
return to education. However, Bound and Solon (1998) argue forcefully that the twins
methodology is problematic, highlighting a number of non-trivial issues. Moreover, this
strategy also constrains us to the assumption that twins/siblings are identical with respect
6to discount rates – which unlike ability (which is arguably genetic) is a taste parameter
and so this would appear to be an even stronger assumption. A further concern for this
approach is that when identiﬁcation relies on diﬀerences in education, there are two points
at which measurement error can occur, consequently identifying the return to education
through diﬀerences in education is likely to be subject to greater measurement error (Harmon
and Walker, 1995). Therefore it is far from certain that twin studies can oﬀer a solution and
return an unbiased estimate of the return to education.
An alternative strategy which has been the focus of much of the literature, is to identify a
variable (or ideally a set of variables) which aﬀect schooling but do not independently enter
into the earnings equation and are uncorrelated with the error term in the wage equation.
If such variable(s) can be found, then they can be used to construct instrumental variables
estimates of the return to education. We will only arrive at a consistent estimator for the
return to education if the model is statistically identiﬁed. Recalling the model from the start
of this section, the moment conditions that we want to impose:
E(Xiǫi) = 0 ⇒ E(Xi(lnwi − X
′
iϕ − βSi)) = 0 (6)
E(Siǫi) = 0 ⇒ E(Si(lnwi − X
′
iϕ − βSi)) = 0 (7)
would be suﬃcient to identify the model’s parameters – providing us with a consistent
estimator for β. The corresponding sample moments provide K equations to estimate K
parameters, therefore we can estimate ˆ ϕ and ˆ β. However, when we know E(Si ǫi)  = 0
equation (7) no longer holds and we do not have enough equations to solve for the number
of parameters to be estimated. The instrumental variables solution is to use the instrument
to derive an additional moment condition that does hold, and replace E(Si ǫi) = 0 and its
corresponding sample moment condition with the new condition.
If such an instrument, ˆ Si, can be found then the violated moment condition can be
replaced with E(ˆ Si(ln wi - X′
iϕ - β Si)) = 0. Provided ˆ Si is not a linear combination of the
Xis then the corresponding sample moment condition along with the other non-violated
7moment conditions will be suﬃcient to identify the parameters ˆ ϕ and ˆ β.
Allowing heterogeneity across individuals in marginal costs of education (due to dif-
ferences in discount rates) and in marginal returns to education, according to individual
characteristics in the vectors X and Z, we can write:
g′(S)
g(S)
= bi; bi = Xiγ1 + u1i (8)
φ
′(S) = r = ri + kS; k ≥ 0; ri = Xiγ2 + Ziπ + u2i (9)
Marginal returns to schooling are constant (within individual), whereas the marginal costs of
schooling are increasing in the level of schooling. This is plausible if individuals can ﬁnance
education initially from family resources, then perhaps from government funding and later
only through their own private sources, and if the time and psychic costs of education
increase with the level of the qualiﬁcation/education in question. Equating equations (8)






= Xi˜ γ + Zi˜ π + ui (10)
We can get back to the Mincerian speciﬁcation of the human capital earnings function
(equation (1)) by integrating the marginal beneﬁts of education over the years of education
(and here we specify explicitly the heterogeneity in returns across individuals by allowing






ds = log(wi) = ai + bisi = Xiϕ + Siβi + ǫi (11)
In this model, we can have ability inﬂuencing individual earnings both through the indi-
vidual intercept term ai (this is the ‘unobserved ability’ that has been the focus of much of
the literature), and through the marginal beneﬁt of an additional year of education captured
in bi, which varies according to the individual’s characteristics. Any candidate instrument
must be independent of the individual ability intercept term ai, which means that Zi must
be orthogonal to ǫi (and indeed to ui). The IV estimate – based on 2SLS in which the
8ﬁrst stage is estimated by (10) and the second stage is estimated by (11) – of the schooling
coeﬃcient β is a weighted average of the marginal returns to education (the βi) for those
whose schooling choice is inﬂuenced by the instrument, conditional on X. In order to give
this ‘local average treatment eﬀect’ (LATE) interpretation, there is a monotonicity require-
ment that all individuals have the same signed response to the instrument i.e. in the case of
RoSLA this is that ˜ π is greater than or equal to zero for all individuals i.e. no-one chooses
less education as a result of the change in the minimum school leaving age.
There is a large literature in this area in which a number of instruments have been used.
Many studies are reviewed in Card (2000). Some studies exploit institutional features or
policy changes while others rely on variations in costs across individuals (in each case these
instruments alter the marginal cost functions ri). The latter includes instrumenting using
college proximity (for example, Card, 1995), while the former group includes the seminal
Angrist and Krueger (1991) paper exploiting diﬀerences in schooling owing to the interac-
tion of quarter-of-birth and state variation in when children have to commence compulsory
schooling.
While IV has the advantage that we can potentially derive estimates purged of the bi-
ases discussed above, it also has some shortcomings. Weak instruments (that is, those that
although uncorrelated with wages are hardly correlated with schooling) and invalid instru-
ments (those that although correlated with schooling, may also be correlated with wages)
may be worse than no instruments at all – as Bound et al. (1993) put it “the cure can be
worse than the disease”.
A number of authors (Staiger and Stock, 1997, and Bound et al., 1995) have highlighted
that many existing instrumental variables studies have been undermined by a lack of precision
in their ﬁrst stage estimates. If the instrument used is only weakly correlated with the
endogenous regressor (schooling) then the IV estimates are potentially as biased as the OLS
estimates. Bound and Jaeger (1996) show how quarter-of-birth interactions with state and
year, used in Angrist and Krueger (1991), form weak instruments that cause IV to be more
9biased than OLS.
Much attention has been given to the weak instruments issue in the econometrics lit-
erature of the last 15 years and it is now well established (see for example, Baum et al.
(2007), Murray (2006a,b)) that two-stage least squares performs very poorly in the presence
of weak instruments: not only are point estimates biased, the estimated standard errors of
parameters are too small such that conﬁdence intervals are too narrow. Consequently null
hypotheses are too readily rejected, and inference can be wildly incorrect.
Further, Bound et al. (1995) show that even a small correlation between the instrument
and the error term in the wage equation can result in a large bias in the IV estimates even
in large samples. This problem is compounded if the instrument is weak, the magnitude of
the bias in the IV approaches the bias in the OLS as the R2 from the ﬁrst stage regression
of the endogenous explanatory variable on the instruments approaches zero.
While this ﬁrst stage R2 statistic has previously not been routinely reported, the problem
of weak instruments has been quite prevalent since most of the IV studies surveyed in Card
(2000) suﬀer from imprecision and the IV returns are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to those
from OLS. Since the work of Staiger and Stock (1997), Bound et al. (1995) and more
recently Stock and Yogo (2005), it has become more common to report the ﬁrst stage R2
and the F-statistic on the exclusion of the instruments from the ﬁrst stage, which help to
conﬁrm the relevance of a candidate instrument. However, the above named authors have
helped to establish that even when an instrument is signiﬁcant at conventional levels, it
may still be weak and lead to the problems of bias and unreliable inference outlined above.
As a result, Stock and Yogo (2005) have developed a number of tests for the presence of
weak instruments, tabulating critical values depending on whether we use 2SLS, the limited
information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator or Fuller’s modiﬁed LIML estimator.
Thus it is crucial to establish that there is a strong relationship between the instrument
and the endogenous regressor (schooling) i.e. that the instrument is relevant; and that it
passes the various tests to establish that it is not a weak instrument.
10It is not routinely possible however to test an instrument for correlation with the error
term in the wage equation (i.e. test the validity) as to do that we would ﬁrst need to estimate
the wage equation to give us a valid error term which requires a consistent estimator for ϕ
and β, but we can only ﬁnd a consistent estimator if we have an alternative instrument
that we know is valid and strong in the ﬁrst place. The advantage in having multiple
instruments – as I have in this study – is that this allows me to determine the validity of the
preferred instrument (early smoking), exploiting the validity of the other instrument available
(RoSLA). In addition to this formal econometric test of the instrument’s validity, I am also
able to provide further supportive evidence for the validity of the early smoking instrument
from the reduced forms, from intuition and from the consistency of results estimated with
diﬀerent instruments. As Murray (2006b) points out, every candidate instrument arrives on
the scene with “a dark cloud of invalidity overhead” (p. 114). While this cloud can rarely be
completely chased away, I believe that there is very strong evidence in favour of the validity
of early smoking as an instrument.
An additional problem with the IV strategies is that what they capture is a ‘local average
treatment eﬀect’ (LATE), as outlined above in the formal modelling4. The basic problem
is that while OLS provides an estimate of the average marginal return to another year of
schooling, the IV estimator provides a weighted average marginal return to another year of
schooling with the weighting determined by the extent to which individuals’ behaviour is
changed by the ‘treatment’ (Angrist and Imbens, 1995). Card (1998) notes that depending
on whether the marginal returns to education for individuals in the ‘treatment’ group are
higher or lower than the average marginal return to education, the IV estimator may over-
or under-estimate the average marginal return to education for the population as a whole. In
these circumstances it is not possible to generalise from the IV estimates to all individuals.
Prior to Angrist and Imbens formalisation of LATE reasoning, Lang’s (1993) paper – in
which the term ‘discount rate bias’ was ﬁrst used – criticised Angrist and Krueger (1991)
4As the endogenous variable is not binary, technically the IV estimates a ‘local average partial eﬀect’, see
Wooldridge (2002) ch. 18.
11on the basis that what they were identifying was in fact a LATE, though Lang termed
it ‘discount rate bias’. Kling (2000) has demonstrated how Card’s 1995 paper using the
proximity of a four-year college to instrument for education does indeed capture the return
for less advantaged families whose schooling decisions were most eﬀected by the reduced cost
associated with a college being nearby. This was Card’s intuition in the paper, and Kling
has formally shown that Card’s estimates do indeed capture a LATE. This is not necessarily
a problem, the estimate is not invalid, however it does aﬀect the interpretation. In this case
Card captures a LATE which from a policy perspective is an important LATE to know.
I have already outlined the argument that, for a given level of education, those with higher
discount rates will have higher ability. Therefore when we take a given level of education –
for example the 10 years education that was the minimum prior to the date when the school
leaving age in England was raised from 15 to 16 – those with high discount rates will have
greater ability than those who choose to leave at 15 because of low returns to education.
Thus to the extent that individuals in the low education group have high discount rates
because of higher than average costs of education rather than lower than average returns
to education, LATE reasoning suggests that IV estimates that isolate this group will ﬁnd
returns that are higher than the average marginal return to education, and may be higher
than the OLS estimates (Lang, 1993; Card, 2000).
Alternatively, one could argue that the majority of individuals in this group whose be-
haviour is aﬀected by the raising of the school leaving age, are low discount rate, low ability
and would have located at the minimum prior to the raising of the school leaving age because
their return to schooling has already fallen to the same (low) level as their discount rate.
In this case, we would expect that the IV estimates of the return to education would be
below the average marginal return to an additional year of education. Figure 1 shows the
education leaving age density when the minimum school leaving age is 15 compared with
when it is 16. It is clear that in the upper ranges the densities are very similar, and that
the increase in minimum school leaving age aﬀects only the lower part of the distribution
12of leaving ages. This concurs with the evidence of Chevalier et al. (2004) who use a large
sample of data from the General Households Survey (GHS) and ﬁnd – using a number of
tests of the equality of distributions – that RoSLA only aﬀected the attainment of those at
the bottom of the schooling distribution, there was not a ripple eﬀect further up. Similarly,
Oreopoulos (2006) concludes that the earlier RoSLA (in 1947 raising the minimum age from
14 to 15) only aﬀected the lower part of the distribution, and Harmon and Walker (1995)
using both the 1947 and 1973 RoSLA ﬁnd that only the lower portion of the distribution is
aﬀected. Whether these individuals aﬀected by the policy are predominantly high discount
rate or predominantly low ability will determine whether we expect the IV estimate from
the raising of the school leaving age to be higher or lower than OLS.
Therefore it is important to identify an instrument that avoids these three prominent
problems: being correlated with the structural equation error term, being only weakly cor-
related with the endogenous regressor or capturing a LATE that is not informative when it
comes to answering the question we want to ask – what Murray (2006a) terms the bad, the
weak and the ugly instruments.
4 Instrumenting Education Using Early Smoking
4.1 Theory
Evans and Montgomery (1994) proposed using whether or not an individual smoked when
they were young as an instrument for schooling5. The intuition behind the instrument starts
from the observation that just as schooling is not randomly assigned across the popula-
tion, the decision to engage in (un)healthy habits is not randomly distributed. Evans and
Montgomery note that “one of the most persistent relationships in health economics is that
more educated people have better health and better health habits” (1994, p1). This view
is supported by a number of reviews of the empirical evidence on the link between health
and education by Grossman (see Grossman, 2005). After extensively reviewing the evidence
5This IV strategy has also been pursued by Chevalier and Walker (1999) using GHS and National Child
Development Study (NCDS) data, and by Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2002) for Austrian data.
13Grossman concludes that that completed years of formal schooling is the most important
correlate of good health, and this statement applies whether health is being measured by
mortality rates, morbidity rates, self-evaluated health status or psychological well being
(Grossman, 2000). In the UK, Oreopoulos (2006) uses data from the General Household
Survey (GHS) which asks individuals to self-report their health status, and ﬁnds that an ad-
ditional year of schooling increases the chance that an individual will report good health by
6.0% points, and reduces the chance of reporting poor health by 3.2% points. There remains
a debate as to whether or not this education-health relationship is causal i.e. through more
education people learn the dangers of poor health habits and are thus less likely to engage in
them, with Evans and Montgomery citing a quite diﬀerent explanation for the relationship
due to Victor Fuchs (1982). Fuchs argues that unobserved diﬀerences in the rate of time
preference determine both the number of years schooling that an individual attains and their
investments in health, as both decisions involve a trade oﬀ between current costs and the
discounted value of future beneﬁts.6
As with Becker’s model of human capital accumulation, in a health accumulation model
individuals invest in health until the marginal return to health investment equals their dis-
count rate. If an individual has a higher discount rate because of her rate of time pref-
erence, he/she cares less about the future and more about the present and will therefore
ceteris paribus quit formal education at a younger age and be less likely to invest in good
health habits (and be more likely to engage in unhealthy habits). If the correlation between
health habits, such as smoking, and education is driven by a common unobserved factor
(time-preference) then some health habits could potentially be used as in instrument for
education.
Not all health habits can be used as an instrument for two reasons. Firstly, some
health habits have consumption as well as investment value. Going to the gym or play-
6It is worth noting that the explanations of the health/education correlation as being causal or driven
by unobserved time preference are not mutually exclusive: it may be that education promotes better health
habits or improves the eﬃciency of health inputs but individuals may still choose to act diﬀerently in light
of this education according to their rate of time preference.
14ing squash for example, have consumption value and are likely to be correlated with family
income/background and possibly correlated with the unobserved component of earnings.
Secondly, some health habits such as heavy drinking or drug abuse would be unsuitable as
they are likely to have an eﬀect on current wage through their eﬀect on productivity. I follow
Evans and Montgomery in arguing that smoking as a teenager is a health habit that can be
used as a valid instrument for education.
The decision that an individual makes at age 16 as to whether to continue in education
or not is likely to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by his/her discount rate – whether that is because
of access to ﬁnancial resources or because of the individual’s rate of time preference. In the
UK this is the ﬁrst point at which individuals can choose to leave education, moreover it
remains the case that staying in school post-16 and taking A-levels is still the major route
into university, therefore the decision to remain at school at 16 is likely to be aﬀected by
the individual’s discount rate. Moreover, whether an individual chooses to smoke at 16
is also likely to be determined in large part by their rate of time preference. Whether I
look at the largest sample of working age men available in the BHPS or my estimation
sample it is the case that of the individuals who have ever smoked, approximately 61% were
smoking when age 16, and approximately 80% were smoking when age 187. Therefore it is
clear that the majority of individuals who ever smoke, ﬁrst take that decision at around the
same time that they are making decisions over the continuation of their education. Evans
and Montgomery ﬁnd that the concurrence in the timing of the smoking and school leaving
decisions generates a statistically precise and quantitatively large correlation between years
of education and early smoking and, unsurprisingly, the same relation is found in UK data.
Thus smoking at 16 satisﬁes the ﬁrst criterion for an instrument: it is relevant as it is
strongly correlated with completed education. Moreover, as will be illustrated below, the
eﬀect of early smoking on years of schooling is sizeable (just under one year less education is
completed on average by those who smoke when 16 ceteris paribus), therefore the instrument
7The precise ﬁgures for the estimation sample (largest possible sample) are 60.47% (61.00%) smoking at
age 16, 81.11% (79.73%) smoking at age 18.
15works through a substantial variation in education (Angrist and Krueger (1991) in particular
has been criticized on the basis not only that the correlation between their instrument and
education is low – i.e. low t-statistic(s) on the instrument(s) – but also that it induces only
a very small variation in education attained, approximately only 0.1 years of education).
In addition to looking at the reduced form for years of schooling – which shows that early
smoking has a quantitatively large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on years of schooling
(see Table 5, column 3) – looking at the reduced form for the dependent variable of interest
(log hourly wage), supports the argument that early smoking can be used to instrument for
education. As pointed out in Murray (2006b), if the candidate instrumental variable does
not appear signiﬁcantly in the reduced form for the structural equation dependent variable,
or does but with the ‘wrong’ sign, then this seriously undermines the case for the instrument.
Appendix Table D-1 shows that the smoker-at-16 indicator has a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in
this second reduced form regression, and is negative as the intuition would tell us: those who
smoked when 16 have lower wages that those who did not, with the argument being that
this is driven wholly by the diﬀerence in average years of schooling between the two groups.
The second criterion is validity: the instrument must not be correlated with wage. As I
am using a past health habit, smoking at age 16, to instrument for education in the equation
for current wage, there should not be a correlation via an income eﬀect: the contemporary
wage can have no impact on the disposable income of 16 year old deciding whether or not to
smoke. Moreover, theoretically whether one smoked at 16 should have no independent direct
eﬀect on current wage. It is by no means certain that current smoking aﬀects current wage
via a productivity eﬀect, thus a link between smoking at 16 and current wage would be even
more speculative. So there is no reason to think that smoking at 16 would aﬀect current wage
– and as individuals age and move further away from being 16 this is even more so the case.
Moreover, there is a good degree of movement between smoking and non-smoking amongst
my sample of men, with 42.0% of men who did smoke when they were 16 having stopped by
the time they are ﬁrst observed in the data, and 38.4% of the men who are smokers when
16ﬁrst observed in the data were not smokers at age 16. In light of these arguments, I believe
that smoking at 16 can legitimately be excluded from the wage equation.
However, due to the very nature of the unobservables in the wage equation, it is not
possible a priori to rule out a correlation between smoking at 16 and the unobservables that
do aﬀect wage. If the rate of time preference that characterises early smokers does lead them
into higher than average wage jobs (as one part of the discount rate bias story suggests) then
this would invalidate the instrument and the estimates derived would continue to be biased.
Alternatively, it may be the case that discount rates aﬀects human capital accumulation
but once human capital is controlled for in the wage equation, there is no further aﬀect of
discount rate on earnings. Whether or not the instrument is valid is an empirical point, and
usually it is not possible to formally test for the validity of an instrument.
Fortunately, given I have more than one instrument I have an over identiﬁed system and
can therefore test the validity of the instruments. In section 10 I test the validity of both
instruments and cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are indeed valid.
Moreover, I can use the RoSLA instrument to just identify the system and also include early
smoking as an explanatory variable and ﬁnd that it does not have a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
in the wage equation, which again indicates that it can be excluded from the structural
equation. Both of these tests are predicated on the assumption that the RoSLA instrument
is valid, which I do not believe is a strong assumption given that the raising of the school
leaving age was an exogenous policy change. In addition, in section 10 I discuss the various
diﬀerent robustness tests that I employ when using each instrument separately and when
using both together, in line with what is considered current best practice with instrumental
variables, in order to make the results and inference robust. In all cases both the qualitative
and quantitative nature of the results remains unchanged, and the formal tests support the
strength and validity of the instruments.
If we accept that early smoking satisﬁes these two criteria of relevance (and non-weakness)
and validity then an indicator for early smoking can be used as an instrument: it can be the
17Zi in equation (10), inﬂuencing schooling through changing the marginal costs of schooling
in a way which is uncorrelated with ability.
4.2 Is it a spurious relationship?
This observed relationship between smoking at age 16 and educational attainment could be
driven by something other than rate of time preference, something that also aﬀects wages
and therefore makes the instrument invalid. It could be argued for example, that poorer
socio-economic background lowers education and increases the likelihood of smoking – i.e.
smoking at 16 is more a reﬂection of socio-economic background than discount rate. Clearly
socio-economic background may inﬂuence the decision to smoke at 16, however, my preferred
speciﬁcation of the model includes variables to control for background characteristics at the
time that the individual was a teenager and therefore should take this eﬀect out of the
coeﬃcient on the early smoking indicator. If it is the case that smoking at 16 is channelling
the eﬀects of such characteristics then adding background characteristics into the schooling
demand equation would seriously reduce the impact and signiﬁcance of the smoker at 16
variable. As it is, the coeﬃcient on smoker at 16 changes only from -1.08 (with a standard
error of 0.11) to -0.88 (s.e. 0.11) when we add in the background characteristics. The
background characteristics that I am able to include are dummies for the occupational class
of each parent when the individual was 14, and a dummy to indicate whether the person
lived with both natural parents from birth up until the age of 16. These variables should
do a very good job of capturing the individual’s background socio-economic circumstances
at the time when they are making decisions over education (and whether or not to smoke).
Therefore the fact that when they are included in the model, the smoker at 16 indicator still
has a quantitatively large eﬀect on schooling and is precisely estimated suggests that it is
not socio-economic background that is picked up in the early smoker indicator.
Like Fuchs, in their work on rational addition Becker and Murphy (1988) posit that the
decision to smoke reﬂects discount rate in that it indicates the rate of time preference and
18this is what I argue – that smoking at 16 reﬂects rate of time preference. One way in which
Fuchs supported his hypothesis was to show that education at age 24 when education levels
vary considerably, is as important a predictor of smoking at 17 – when most individuals have
the same level of education – as it is a predictor of smoking at 24 (see Farrell and Fuchs,
1982). Using a larger dataset than my actual estimation sample, I implement a probit of
current smoking using completed years of schooling amongst the explanatory variables, and
repeat the probit for smoking at age 16. The marginal eﬀects estimated at the mean of
the explanatory variables suggest that for each additional year of schooling the probability
of being a current smoker falls by 2.7% (signiﬁcant at below the 1% level). In the probit
for smoking at 16, it is estimated that each additional year of completed education reduces
the probability of having smoked at age 16 by 3.8% (signiﬁcant at the 1% level, see Table
1). Thus completed education is a signiﬁcant determinant of early smoking – suggesting
that it is not greater education that determines the decision (not) to smoke – education
predicts early smoking as well as later smoking, suggesting that another underlying factor
(time preference) is determining both.
Moreover, with regard to the question of whether it is a knowledge eﬀect, it is less likely
to be the case that the education-smoking link is causal, to the extent that formal schooling
is not the main avenue through with knowledge of the detrimental, indeed potentially fatal,
health consequences of smoking are disseminated. Since the mid-1960s, the negative eﬀects
of smoking on health have been known and increasingly communicated to the public via
various awareness campaigns and successive governments have been increasingly direct in
their discouragement to smoke both via taxation and the media. As a result, it is decreasingly
likely to be the case that only through continued education (past the compulsory level) that
individuals are made aware of the negative health eﬀects of smoking. The hypothesis that
the relation between education and smoking is in fact driven by the time preference of the
individual rather than being a causal or knowledge eﬀect can be tested and this is something
that I return to in section 8.
19The correlation between smoking and education is also consistent with an alternative
hypothesis: that those with lower unobserved ability will acquire less education and are
more likely to smoke. I have outlined how ability and discount rate bias interact in a
complex fashion thus it is diﬃcult to completely disentangle the diﬀerent eﬀects. However,
if it is the case that we are primarily picking up some measure of ability then we would
expect that – by deﬁnition – smoking at 16 only aﬀects the education of individuals at the
lower end of the ability distribution. If we assume that the residual from the OLS log wage
regression is a reasonable proxy for ability, we can divide this residual wage distribution into
quintiles and examine whether smoking at 16 is a feature only of low ability (low residual
wage) individuals or if it is something that individuals of all abilities engage in.
Table 2 shows the numbers who smoke at age 16 in each quintile of this residual log wage
distribution. The left-side panel of the table shows that in the lowest quintile approximately
44% of the males smoked at 16. This ﬁgure falls to approximately 39% in the next quintile up
and the next after that (30%) before rising again in the fourth quintile (34%). Despite a fall
in the last quintile, the ﬁgure for the percentage of individuals who smoked at age 16 is still
as high as 23% in the highest quintile of the residual log wage distribution. There are fewer
smokers at 16 in the higher quintiles of the distribution but that is to be expected, given
that smoking at 16 is likely to be in some part be correlated with lower ability. Nevertheless
there remain substantial numbers of smokers at 16 in the highest quintiles of the residual
log wage distribution which indicate the highest ability individuals. To futher illustrate this
point, Figure 2 shows the density of the mean residual log wage for both the smokers and
non-smokers at age 16. While the distribution for non-smokers at 16 is slightly to the right
of that for smokers at 16, we can see that there is a great deal of common support: there
are large numbers of smokers at 16 who have high values of residual log wage.
In addition, Figure 3 plots the density of education leaving age for smokers at 16 and
non-smokers at 16. If it was only low educated, low ability individuals who smoke at 16 then
we would expect the densities to look very diﬀerent with very little mass in the upper ranges
20for the early smokers. However, while the non-smokers at 16 density does have a greater
mass around 21 and less around 15/16 suggesting more non-smokers go to university, it is
quite close to being a general right-ward shift of the distribution compared with the smokers
at 16. This is consistent with the idea that A-levels are the main route into university – we
would expect more lower discount rate individuals to remain in school at 16 and the result
of this is the lower percentage leaving at 16 and the resulting higher percentage leaving at
around 21. Elsewhere the picture is very similar but with the smokers at 16 distribution to
the left of the non-smokers. This is consistent with the discount rate hypothesis which says
that there are smokers and non-smokers at 16 of all abilities and that smoking at 16 has an
eﬀect to reduce education at all points of the ability distribution.
It is certainly true that younger cohorts have consistently acquired more education, and
for the men in my sample, smoking at 16 has generally been decreasing: 39.8% of the cohort
born in the 1940s smoked when 16, this fell in successive cohorts to 30.0% (those born in
the 1950s), 27.8% (60s) before rising again amongst those born in the 1970s, of whom 36.3%
smoked when 16. This general pattern would also lead to a shift of the curve to the right
for non-smokers at 16, therefore to be sure that it is the case that smokers at 16 do get less
education than non-smokers at 16, Figure 4 produces the same plot for the cohorts born in
the 40s, 50s, 60s and 70s (which accounts for 88.0% of the men in my sample)8. For each
cohort the picture broadly follows the pattern of Figure 3: the density for non-smokers is a
rightward shift of the smokers at 16 density, illustrating that for all cohorts there are smokers
at age 16 across the entire distribution of education levels, but that smokers at 16 acquire
less education on average9.
Therefore in answer to the criteria for a suitable instrument: early smoking is not “bad”,
there is no reason to suspect that smoker status at 16 should violate the exclusion restriction
(and this is something that I test, see section 10, to ensure the instrument is valid); it is
8The corresponding graph for individuals born in the 1930s reﬂects a similar pattern but only accounts
for 9.4% of the sample
9The cohort born in the 1970s have a restricted education leaving age in that the majority of this cohort
are 22 years old or younger, hence their distribution is slightly truncated.
21not “weak” as there is a strong, very signiﬁcant and sizeable ceteris paribus eﬀect of early
smoking on years of schooling; and it is not “ugly”, though it captures a LATE – the group
of individuals who have lower education because of a higher than average discount rate –
this is a group comprised of individuals of all abilities and is therefore an informative group
to consider the return to education for, arguably more representative of the population as a
whole than groups identiﬁed by other IV estimation strategies.
5 Data
I use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which is a nationally representative survey
of the population which began in 1991 and follows the sample individuals each year. In 1999
in addition to the core survey there was a supplementary component in which questions were
asked regarding previous health habits. I have constructed an 15-wave pooled-panel dataset
containing variables describing individuals’ characteristics, a dummy to indicate whether
the individual smoked when 16, education, and current hourly wage rate. Since the previous
health habits question was only asked in wave 9, I only have observations from individuals
present in wave 9, but I have all waves of observations for these individuals. I include males
who are in full-time employment (30+hours per week), are not self-employed and are in the
age range 19 to 65 inclusive10.
There are issues of measurement error when using number of years of schooling as the
measure of education, however in order to make my results comparable with the majority
in the literature I use the observed number of years of schooling as my education variable11.
The BHPS does not ask how many years education an individual has nor when the individual
ﬁrst left full-time education, rather it asks the age at which the individual left school and
age at which he/she left further education. As I construct my years of schooling variable
10This age range captures ‘prime-age’ males and ensures that smoking at 18 is not the same as current
smoking for any individuals, as smoking at 18 will be used as an instrument as evidence in support of the
rationale behind the early smoking instrument.
11Formally: Years-of-schooling = (age left education - 5); thus I assume a school start age of 5, which is
the compulsory school start age in the UK.
22from age when left school or age when left further education if the individual went on to
further education, I encounter problems when people return to full-time education after a
number of years away. If an individual completes GCSEs, A-levels, a standard 3-year degree,
then a Masters degree and then a PhD (3 years) this would equate to 21 years of education,
therefore I exclude any individual with more than 21 years recorded education. This excludes
observations from just 84 individuals (3.6% of those with years of schooling calculated)12.
With respect to earnings, it is standard to use the log of hourly earnings and so again for
comparability this is what I have constructed – the log of real wage (using 2006 pounds as
the base)13. I trim the log wage distribution such that the top and bottom 1% within each
year are excluded.
The dataset constructed contains 21,256 observations from 2,266 males with each individ-
ual having between 1 and 15 observations; the mean number of observations per individual
is 9.38, median 1014. Table 3 contains summary statistics for the estimation sample, with
the breakdown by early smoking status in Table 4.
6 Estimation
I cannot exploit the panel to eliminate unobserved ability since completed years of education
is a ﬁxed eﬀect but I can use the repeated observations to improve precision – although I need
then to adjust the standard errors to take account of there being repeated observations of
the same individuals at diﬀerent times15. I do this by allowing clustering for each individual
12The results are robust to an alternative assumption of recoding such that anyone with education greater
than 21 years education is recorded as having 21 years of education.
13Current hourly wage is not explicitly recorded, however following other BHPS users (for example Booth
and Frank (1999)) I constructed the natural log of hourly wage rate by constructing hourly wage as: wi =
PAYGUi /{4.33(JBHRSi + 1.5JBOTi)} where PAYGUi is gross monthly earnings before tax and other
deductions in current main job; JBHRSi is standard weekly hours worked; and JBOTi is overtime hours
worked each week. It is assumed overtime is paid at 1.5 times the normal hourly wage, 4.33 ≈ no. weeks
per month. Therefore wi = (Monthly Gross Earnings/No. hours worked per month) = Hourly wage rate.
14I order to avoid issues around diﬀerential attrition, I have re-estimated the models using both inverse
probability weighting and also including in the regressions a variable indicating the number of observations
that each individual has, and in each case the results remain, available from the author.
15As the ﬁrst stage involves regression of years-of-schooling – which is time-invariant– on characteristics,
I re-estimate the model using just one observation (their ﬁrst) for each member of the sample but then all
of the observations in the second stage, bootstrapping to get the correct standard errors in each stage. The
23in the variance-covariance matrix which allows for there to be a correlation between the error
terms for each individual but no correlation between the error terms of diﬀerent individuals.
The robust standard errors generated do not impose any assumptions on the functional form
of the potential correlations and heteroskedasticity controlled for in the error.
I aim to produce estimates that are comparable with other research so I begin by es-
timating a conventional human capital earnings function where the dependent variable is
the natural log of real hourly wage, and the explanatory variables are age, age-squared, and
years-of-schooling. I also include controls for ethnicity, for region (using the 13 standard re-
gions) in order to pick up regional eﬀects such as real wage diﬀerentials, year-of-birth16 and
its square to pick up cohort eﬀects17 and dummies for parental characteristics. As discussed,
I include parental characteristics because in their absence, the smoking at 16 variable could
be picking up background characteristics correlated with education and smoking at 16. The
parental characteristics variables that I have are the standard occupational classiﬁcation of
the job of both the individual’s father and mother when the individual is 14 years of age,
and a dummy to indicate that the individual lived with both natural parents from birth up
to the age of 16. Including year dummies in the model would be problematic since I in-
clude both age and year-of-birth, however I do include controls for whether it was the early-,
mid-, late-1990s or post-2000 to allow for business cycle eﬀects 18. Mincer’s speciﬁcation of
the human capital earnings function, included experience and experience-squared. In the
absence of information on labour market experience, Mincer suggested potential experience
i.e. age minus schooling minus six (assuming individuals begin schooling aged six), could
be used as an approximation. However, using this approximation would mean that mea-
results for the early smoker instrument and for the RoSLA instrument are in the appendix Tables B-1 and
B-2 respectively. There is no substantive change in the conclusions. Similarly the models can be estimated
on any single wave and the nature of the results does not change, available from the author.
16Year-of-birth is rescaled such that 1897=1,..., 1989=93, since in the range 1897-1989 the birth years in
my total dataset, year-of-birth and year-of-birth-squared are perfectly collinear.
17Including a higher order polynomial in a suitably rescaled year-of-birth does not alter the results nor
add to precision in the estimates and so in the interests of parsimony only a quadratic is used.
18These dummies are signiﬁcant in the wage equation, though their inclusion/exclusion does not alter the
coeﬃcient on the instrument (1st stage) or ˆ Si in the second stage.
24surement error in the education variable would necessarily transmit into the experience and
experience-squared variables and moreover, the endogeneity of schooling (our main concern)
will lead to potential experience and its square being endogenous, resulting in three endoge-
nous regressors. Age and age-squared are the standard candidates to use as instruments for
experience and its square, and are widely used as such, therefore this is the approach that I
have taken.
I estimate the model ﬁrst by OLS. I then implement the IV regression using the smoker
at 16 indicator as the instrument generating the variation in years-of-schooling.
7 Results
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 reports the OLS estimate of the human capital earnings function,
the second column reports the IV results using smoking at 16 as the instrument. The third
column reports the results from the reduced form equation for years of schooling. Looking
at the third column of Table 5 we can see that individuals who smoke when they are 16
have on average 0.88 fewer years of schooling than those who do not smoke when they are
16. The robust standard error is 0.108 giving an absolute value of the t-statistic of 8.13.
Therefore smoking when 16 is strongly signiﬁcant for education, and the parameter precisely
estimated. This is encouraging given the concerns raised by inter alia Staiger and Stock
(1997) and Bound et al. (1995) concerning the precision of ﬁrst stage estimates. The R2 of
0.246 is higher than the R2 for ﬁrst stage regressions in some other IV studies19, and the
F-statistic of 66.17 suggests a very strong instrument. The partial-R2 of the eﬀect of the
instrument on years-of-schooling having partialled out the eﬀect of the other covariates is
0.0289 which is high relative to the guidelines given by Bound et al. (1995). In terms of
formal tests for weak identiﬁcation, when using 2SLS-IV (as opposed to LIML or Fuller’s
modiﬁed LIML) one of Stock and Yogo’s (2005) test statistics can be constructed. The test
is based on the Wald test statistic for β: under weak identiﬁcation, the Wald test rejects
19Harmon and Walker (1995) for example have a ﬁrst stage R2 of 0.147.
25too frequently. The test statistic centres on the rejection rate that the researcher is willing
to tolerate if the true rejection rate should be 5%. The test statistic when standard errors
are clustered is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic20. Critical values relevant when
standard errors are clustered have not (at time of writing) been tabulated, however stata’s
ivreg2 routine reports the critical values for the i.i.d. errors case, which Baum et al. (2007)
suggest applying though with caution (or alternatively falling back on the original Staiger
and Stock (1997) rule-of-thumb that the F-statistic should be 10 or more). If we are willing
to accept an actual rejection rate of 10% (the lowest tabulated value) when it should be 5%,
the critical value is 16.38: therefore the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of 66.167 that I
get, overwhelmingly indicates that there is not a problem of weak identiﬁcation introducing
bias to the coeﬃcient on years of schooling.
Therefore controlling for parental characteristics and year-of-birth, smoking at 16 reduces
education by almost 1 year and is precisely estimated. The coeﬃcients on year-of-birth and
year-of-birth-squared suggest that from the 1920s onwards, later year of birth is associated
with a greater number of years of schooling until the mid-1950s at which point this levels
oﬀ for a decade before starting to decrease. Turning to the parental occupation dummies,
we can see some signiﬁcant eﬀects on years of schooling21, particularly for the father’s oc-
cupational class. As we might expect almost all of the higher occupational strata dummies
(the lower numbers) are associated with sizeable positive eﬀect on an individual’s education
and are precisely estimated. This is particularly true of management (1), professional oc-
cupations (2) and associate professional/technical occupations (3), increasing education by
1.1 and 2.3 and 1.5 years respectively. Much fewer of the mother’s occupation variables are
signiﬁcant, though a mother in a professional occupation (2) has sizeable positive and sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on education (associated with 1.4 years more education). The fact that these
parental characteristics dummies are strongly signiﬁcant in the schooling equation but then
20In the special case, as we have here, of a single endogenous regressor, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F-statistic reduces to the standard F-statistic on the exclusion of the instruments from the ﬁrst stage.
21The omitted category are plant or machine operatives.
26not signiﬁcant in the IV wage equation suggests that parental characteristics have a strong
inﬂuence on education controlling for discount rate, but then controlling for education these
parental characteristics do not inﬂuence wage.
Turning to columns 1 and 2, the OLS estimate suggests that an additional year of school-
ing increases wage by 4.6% whereas the IV estimate suggests the return is 12.9%. We expect
that the IV results will be less precisely estimated than the OLS, and while the robust stan-
dard error on years of schooling in the instrumented regression is higher at 0.020 compared to
0.003 in the OLS regression, this still gives a t-statistic of 6.31 and is therefore still precisely
estimated and signiﬁcant at all conventional levels. The dramatic diﬀerence in the estimated
coeﬃcients suggests that years of schooling is an endogenous variable, and this conclusion is
strengthened if I include the residual from the ﬁrst stage reduced form equation as a regres-
sor in the OLS regression, providing a Hausman test of the endogeneity of schooling. The
absolute value of the t-statistic on this residual is 4.7822.
There is nothing unexpected in the coeﬃcients on the other variables. The dummy for
the South-East region is signiﬁcant in both the OLS and IV wage regressions, and is precisely
estimated in each. Since the South East region contains London, it is expected that there
will be a positive coeﬃcient on wages given the London weighting. The R2 for the OLS
regression of 0.265 is comparable to other IV studies23where it is usually in the range 0.25
to 0.35. Though the R2 for the instrumented regression is lower at 0.072 the fact that I
am using instrumental variables suggests that goodness of ﬁt is not what I am primarily
seeking, my main concern is to ﬁnd a consistent estimator of the causal eﬀect of education
on earnings and that is what the instrumented regressions allow me to estimate24.
Estimation of the IV using the Fuller-LIML estimator rather than standard 2SLS-IV, in
order to be as robust as possible to any potential bias in the IV estimates, does not result
22Using the endogeneity test built into stata’s ivreg2 routine provides a similarly emphatic conﬁrmation
of the endogeneity of years-of-schooling: the null that the variable is exogenous is strongly rejected, the
C-test statistic is 22.78 which has a p-value of 0.0000.
23Card (1995); Angrist and Krueger (1991); Harmon and Walker (1995).
24Moreover, in the context of IV, the reported R2 has no natural interpretation, and can in fact be negative.
27in any substantive change to the estimated coeﬃcients or standard errors: the return to
schooling in the IV estimation remains 12.9, st. err. of 0.020 (see Appendix Table C-1 for
the results of the Fuller(1) estimation25). Moreover, since when the Fuller-LIML estimator is
used the ﬁnite moments of the IV estimator exist, the Stock-Yogo (2005) test for the maximal
relative (to OLS) bias in the IV coeﬃcient can be performed: again the Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F-statistic is compared with the critical values tabluated by Stock and Yogo: as the
F-statistic is 66.167 again the null of bias is strongly rejected.
8 Analysis
The results that I ﬁnd are in line with those found in other studies. Angrist and Krueger
(1991) ﬁnd a return to schooling of 7.0% by OLS rising to 10% by IV (quarter of birth and
state interactions). Card (1995) ﬁnds an increase in the estimated return to schooling from
7.3% by OLS to 13.2% by IV (college proximity). In studies using UK data, Harmon and
Walker have consistently found results similar to my ﬁndings: using Family Expenditure
Survey (FES) data for 1978-1986 they ﬁnd estimates of 6.1% by OLS and 15.3% by IV
(RoSLA, 1995), using the NCDS26 they ﬁnd estimates of 5.0% by OLS and 9.9% by IV
(peer eﬀects and education system level eﬀects, Harmon and Walker, 2000), and using the
GHS data they ﬁnd results of 4.9% by OLS rising to 14.0% by IV (RoSLA and educational
reforms, Harmon and Walker, 1999). Chevalier and Walker (1999) ﬁnd using an earlier
smaller sample of BHPS men (using just 6 waves) an OLS estimate of 6.4% rising to 20.5%
using IV (RoSLA). Chevalier and Walker also construct estimates using smoking status at
16 and NCDS data, estimating a return of 6.1% by OLS, rising to 8.0% by IV; and using
GHS data they estimate an OLS return of 6.4% rising to 9.5% when instrumenting using
smoking status at 14/16/18.
More recently Oreopoulos (2006) has used the 1947 raising of the school leaving age in
25The modiﬁed LIML estimator introduced by Fuller, with the Fuller parameter (a) set to 1 is regarded
as most robust to any potential weakness of the instrument.
26National Child Development Study.
28Britain, from 14 to 1527, and GHS data to compute a standard IV estimate and a regression
discontinuity IV estimate of the return to schooling, arguing that as this was a reform which
aﬀected around half of the population, the estimated LATE is closer to the average treatment
eﬀect (ATE). Oreopoulos estimates the return for British males (aged 32-64) to an additional
year of education to be 5.5% by OLS, rising to 9.4% by IV, though the IV estimate is
imprecisely estimated. Implementing a regression discontinuity design, Oreopoulos estimates
a return of 15.0% for men, though again the estimate is rather imprecise28.
Therefore my results of 4.6% by OLS rising to 12.9% by IV are of similar magnitude to
the studies above, particularly the Harmon and Walker (1995).
8.1 Testing for a spurious relationship
8.1.1 Is it a background eﬀect?
As outlined in section 4.2, it may be argued that the early smoker indicator is picking up
diﬀerences in background characteristics between those who do and do not smoke at 16, and
that these characteristics also aﬀect wage. Hence the need to control as much as possible
for socio-economic characteristics of the individuals at the time that they are making their
decisions over education and smoking. As a robustness check I also estimate the model
without the parental characteristic variables included, see Table 6. As alluded to in 4.2, the
eﬀect of removing the background characteristic variables is that the coeﬃcient on the smoker
at 16 indicator in the reduced form schooling demand equation increases to -1.08 (robust s.e.
0.113, t =-9.61). The F-statistic on the exclusion of the instrument is 92.39, with the partial-
R2 of the instrument of 0.0400, again both suggesting a strong instrument29, with a total R2
for the ﬁrst stage of 0.143, again comparable with similar studies. The estimated return to
education in the wage equation is 12.1% (robust s.e. 0.016, t =7.56). Thus with the nature
27Harmon and Walker (1995) exploit both this 1947 raising of the school leaving age, and the later increase
from 15 to 16 in 1973 to derive their IV estimates.
28When Oreopoulos implements his IV and RD models for all individuals – i.e. including females as well
as males – the estimated returns are precisely estimated (1% level) and suggest returns of 14.7% (RD) and
15.8% (IV).
29Clearly with the F-statistic even higher than before, the Stock-Yogo formal tests of weak identiﬁcation
continue to overwhelmingly suggest a strong instrument.
29of the result remaining unchanged, it is clear that the inclusion of parental characteristics is
not driving the result.
8.1.2 Is it a knowledge eﬀect?
As discussed in section 4.2 it could be argued that the correlation between health and edu-
cation is indeed a causal relationship: individuals with more education have more knowledge
of the health consequences of certain habits and are less likely to engage in them. However,
as outlined above, to the extent that public information campaigns have made the health
risks of a particular habit known to the majority of the population, the correlation between
education and that habit is more likely to be due to variations in unobserved factors such
as discount rates. In the 1940s and 1950s we would expect less of a correlation between
smoking and education, because smoking was not known then to be an investment in health
choice. However, given the vast amount of information available to the public since the 1960s
concerning the risks of smoking, it is fair to deduce that compared to other health habits, the
correlation between smoking and schooling is more likely to reﬂect individuals’ investment
choices driven by time preference rather than knowledge.
Following Evans and Montgomery (1994), to test this hypothesis, we can postulate that
if there has been an increase in the general availability to the public of information on the
risks of smoking, then we would expect that decisions to smoke at age 16 taken after the
eﬀects were widely known are more likely to reﬂect diﬀerences in discount rates, thus the
negative correlation between schooling and smoking at 16 should be higher for individuals
who reach 16 after the eﬀects of smoking were widely known. If however the link between
smoking and education is due to knowledge eﬀects, after the knowledge of the consequences
of smoking are widely known, the correlation should disappear. The ﬁrst Surgeon General’s
report highlighting the health eﬀects of smoking was published in 1964, therefore I have
repeated the estimation and rather than including smoking at 16 alone as an instrument, I
interacted this variable with a dummy indicating that the individual turned 16 before the
report was published and a dummy indicating that the individual turned 16 after the report
30was published (i.e. in 1965 or later). If the relationship becomes stronger i.e. if the t-statistic
on the smoking term interacted with the turned 16 post-1964 indicator is greater in absolute
value than the turned 16 pre-1964 interaction term this would suggest that the relationship
is reﬂecting diﬀerences in discount rates.
In Table 7, I report the ﬁrst stage regression coeﬃcients on these interaction terms when
we use these terms rather than just smoking at 16. We can see that both the interaction
terms are precisely estimated, signiﬁcant and that the term for individuals who turned 16 in
1965 or later has a coeﬃcient which is larger in absolute value by 0.1 years of education and
has a substantially lower standard error, thus suggesting a stronger relationship post-1964.
A further test of the hypothesis that there is a causal link between education and smoking
is to remove individuals who have less than the 11 years of education that the majority of
individuals should have by the time that they are 16 and make the decision over whether or
not to smoke and whether to continue in education30. Re-estimating on this smaller sample
produces the results in the Appendix Table A-1. As can be seen, there are no substantive
changes to the results in either the ﬁrst or second stage regressions: smoking at 16 has an
almost identical eﬀect on years of education on this sample as it does the full sample.
8.1.3 Is it an ability eﬀect?
Another issue is the question of whether smoking at 16 is just picking up diﬀerences in
ability. As already discussed, if smoking at 16 was picking up (lack of) ability, we would
not expect that smoking at 16 would occur across the whole wage residual distribution as
we have seen that it does – signiﬁcant numbers smoked at 16 in the upper quintiles of the
log wage residual distribution. If we continue to use the wage residual distribution as a
proxy for ability and, again dividing it into ﬁve quintiles, look at the ﬁrst stage reduced form
schooling equations, we can see that the eﬀect of smoking at 16 is actually increasing as we
move up the distribution. The left side of Table 8 shows that in the lowest quintile, schooling
is reduced by 0.77 years, this is equivalent to a reduction of 6.21% of the mean number of
30This removes 527 (23.3%) of the men from the data and 4271 (20.1%) of the observations.
31years of education in this group. In the second and third quintiles the reduction in education
associated with early smoking is even greater both in absolute terms and relative to mean
education in these quintiles. The fourth quintile is aﬀected the least by early smoking but
still it is associated with three-quarters of a year less education, and in the highest quintile
the estimated reduction is 0.88 years, 6.9% of mean education in this quintile. We can see
in the Table 2 that there are signiﬁcant numbers of individuals who smoke at 16 in all of
the quintiles thus these results are not due to small numbers of smokers at 16, and the
coeﬃcient on smoking at 16 is signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all quintiles. Far from only
aﬀecting the low ability individuals, this evidence indicates that smoking at 16 has a greater
absolute and relative eﬀect on the highest ability individuals. This supports the hypothesis
that individuals of all abilities smoke at 16 because of their rate of time preference.
To further pursue the hypothesis that individuals who have lower ability are likely to
get less education and are more likely to smoke, I have replicated my results using smoking
at age 18 rather than smoking at age 16. Age 18 is the point at which individuals in the
UK have to decide whether to remain in education and go to university, and this decision is
likely to be aﬀected by their rate of time preference. Moreover, it is more diﬃcult to argue
that smokers at 18 are more likely to be lower ability than higher ability individuals. The
right panel of Table 2 shows the numbers who smoke at age 18 in the quintiles of the log
wage residual distribution. The table illustrates that in the lowest quintile the smokers at
18 out number non-smokers (54% v 46%), and this remains the case in the next quintile up
(52% smokers v 48% non). As with smoking at 16, the numbers who did smoke are generally
lower as we move up the quintiles yet in the highest quintile, still as much as 35% of the
individuals smoked at 18. There are a higher number of individuals who smoked at 18 in the
upper quintiles than in the corresponding table for smoking at 16, indeed in each quintile
there are more smokers at 18 than there were at 16, at least a 10%-point swing to smokers
from non-smokers compared with the age 16 measure. This further supports the idea that
teenage smoking is a habit that high discount rate individuals of all abilities engage in.
32Using smoking at 18 as the instrument, I obtain the results in Table 9. Looking at the
third column, the reduced form equation for schooling, smoking at 18 reduces education by
0.75 years. This is lower than the corresponding reduction associated with smoking at 16
but this is consistent with the time preference story: smokers at 18 have a higher discount
rate than non-smokers at 18 but ceteris paribus smokers at 16 will have a higher discount
rate than smokers at 18. If smokers at 18 have a lower discount rate relative to those who
smoke at 16, they will remain in education longer thus we expect that the reduction in
education for smoking at 18 is not as much as it is for smoking at 16. The robust standard
error on smoking at 18 is 0.108, giving a t-statistic with an absolute value of 6.93, therefore
the parameter remains precisely estimated. The ﬁrst stage regression is very similar to ﬁrst
stage regression when using smoking at 16. The R2 for this ﬁrst stage regression is 0.242 so
again high relative to other studies’ ﬁndings and the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic
of 48.025 again rejects even a hint of weak identiﬁcation.
Turning to column 2, the estimated return to schooling when we instrument with smoking
at 18, is slightly higher at 13.5% than the corresponding ﬁgure using smoking at 16 (12.9%),
but not by very much. The parameter remains precisely estimated, robust standard error of
0.023 giving a t-statistic of 5.76. Of the other covariates in the model, each has a coeﬃcient
and standard error very close to the estimate when I use smoking at 16.
As I get very similar results with smoking at 18 as I do using smoking at 16, and given
the distribution of smokers at 16 and 18 throughout the wage distribution, I believe that
this is evidence to support the hypothesis that early smoking is picking up the discount rate
of the individual rather than being a proxy for ability. Estimates using smoking at 17 rather
than 16 or 18 give similar results.
8.1.4 Is it a work eﬀect?
An alternative explanation for the observed relationship between early smoking and lower
education, could be that some of the individuals who get a low level of education leave school
before they are 16 as non-smokers and enter work. Then ﬁnding themselves in the more adult
33environment of work rather than school, and perhaps inﬂuenced by older colleagues, these
low educated men then start to smoke. This reverse causation from low education to smoking
at 16 would change the interpretation of the LATE. We would eﬀectively be identifying the
return to education for early school leavers who then start to smoke at work – a group much
less representative than the discount rate hypothesis would suggest. One way in which to
explore this “started smoking at work” hypothesis, is to instrument using smoking status at
age 15 rather than 16. Almost the entire sample31 of men would have been in school when
aged 15, even if leaving at the minimum age, therefore if they were a smoker at 15 they will
likely have started smoking whilst at school rather than in work. This would suggest that
it is something (i.e. discount rate) other than adult work environment which is driving the
decision to commence smoking and also the decision to ﬁnish school. Table 10 illustrates
the results of the IV regression when we use the smoker at 15 indicator as the instrument.
The second column shows that the estimated return to education in this new instrumented
regression is almost identical to the case when the instrument is smoker at 16 status: the
estimate falls to 12.8% from 12.9%. Moreoever, looking at the ﬁrst stage regression (column
3) we see that smoking at age 15 reduces the average number of years of education by 0.95
years (t = −7.76) – which is a greater reduction than we ﬁnd with the smoker at 16 indicator
(0.88 years) and the smoker at 18 indicator (0.75 years), and is highly signiﬁcant. This is
again entirely consistent with the discount rate hypothesis: smokers at 15 have a greater
discount rate than non-smokers at 15 and have a greater discount rate than smokers at 16
(or 18), hence the greater associated reduction in years of education. There are substantial
numbers who do smoke at age 15: 334 of the 2266 men in the sample (14.7%), though as
would be expected, many fewer than the number who smoke at age 16 (765 out of 2266 men,
33.8%). This evidence therefore adds weight to the discount rate hypothesis, as opposed
to the alternative “started smoking at work”. Moreover, Table 11 shows the results when
using smoking status at 14 as the instrument. Again the instrument is associated with a large
31There are 73 out of 2266 men in the sample for whom the minimum leaving age was 14 rather than 15
or 16
34reduction in years of schooling (0.91 years, t = −6.17) and the estimated return to education
is 15.0%32. These results again support the discount rate hypothesis, especially considering
that all of the 216 men in the sample (9.5%) who did smoke at 14 faced a minimum school
leaving age of at least 15, which completely rules out the proposed alternative explanation
for the smoking/education correlation. Though it is noted that the numbers who smoke
when 14 are lower than for the other ages, taken with the results for smokers at 15, 16 and
18, these results add weight to the discount rate hypothesis.
8.2 Testing for the discount rate hypothesis
One ﬁnal test of whether early smoking is picking up diﬀerences in time preference is to test
whether early smoking is correlated with other future oriented behaviours such as saving,
investing and taking precautionary health measures. Home-ownership is one such measure
of future orientated behaviour, and Table 12 presents a probit of home-ownership in which
the explanatory variables are those included in the wage equation (bar years-of-schooling)33,
plus log wage itself and the early smoking indicator. The marginal eﬀects estimated at the
means of the explanatory variables suggest that smoking at 16 is associated with a 4.4%
reduction in the probability of being a home owner, and is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Thus,
controlling for human capital and other background characterisitcs to capture heterogeneity,
early smoking is associated with a signiﬁcantly lower probability of being a homeowner,
supporting the idea that early smoking is revealing something of the individual’s discount
rate.
There is an obvious problem in looking at health measures when early smoking is an
explanatory variable in that there may be direct consequences of the early smoking on the
health outcome, hence the need to look at health related behaviours rather than outcomes.
Table 13 contains the results of probit regression of having a dental check up in the past year,
32As with smoker at 16 or 18, both the smoker at 15 and smoker at 14 instruments are strong using the
Stock-Yogo criteria.
33I exclude years-of-schooling, including log wage instead, if years-of-schooling is included it is not signiﬁ-
cant and alters the smoking coeﬃcient very slightly.
35and having an eye check in the past year, using the same explanatory variables as in the
home-ownership probit. Having regular dental and eye check-ups involve trading oﬀ future
beneﬁts (preventing ill health and associated costs) for current costs (time and expense of
appointments) and thus should be inﬂuenced by the individual’s rate of time preference. As
can be seen in these tables, controlling for characteristics and log wage, individuals who were
early smokers are 4.0% less likely to have had a dental check up and 2.9% less likely to have
had an opticians check up in the past year, each signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Though these
are not perfect indicator measures, with potential problems in each case, they do add to the
evidence that the early smoking-education link is capturing the eﬀect of the individual’s rate
of time preference.
Given all of the tests I have conducted, I am satisﬁed that smoking at age 16 is a valid
instrument for education, and conclude therefore that the OLS estimates are underestimating
the return to education. I am not claiming to recover the ‘true’ return to education and
the underlying schooling demand equation. What I have done is estimate the return to
education, negating the discount rate bias present in OLS by using smoking at 16 in the
schooling equation to generate some variation in schooling which is uncorrelated with the
wage equation error term – something that the dual instruments allow me to test (more in
section (10)). Moreover, I am removing the ability bias that is present in OLS estimates,
as the instrument is uncorrelated with ability – individuals of all abilities can have a high
discount rate because of their rate of time preference. Therefore I am conﬁdent that the
instrumental variables estimation has removed the bias from the OLS, allowing a consistent
estimate of the return to education.
My estimate is a local average treatment eﬀect. However, I argue that smoking at 16
demonstrates that the individual has a high discount rate because of their rate of time pref-
erence. Thus when I estimate the return to education using smoking at 16 as an instrument,
what I am recovering is the average marginal return to education for the group of individuals
who have high discount rates not because they have poor access to ﬁnance, but because they
36have a rate of time preference that reﬂects that they favour the present.
The natural ‘local average treatment eﬀect’ question is whether I should expect the
average marginal return to education to be higher or lower for individuals in this group than
the average marginal return to education in the population as a whole? Since individuals
of all abilities have rates of time preference that are reﬂected in a high discount rate, and
we have seen that smoking at 16 aﬀects all across the (log wage residual proxying for)
ability distribution, we do not have the ‘problem’ that estimates using compulsory schooling
laws are subject to: that they identify returns for individuals with low education and who
are (arguably) disproportionately of low ability. If ability is distributed amongst the early
smokers group in the same way that it is amongst the population then these early smoker
IV estimates are more appropriate for making inferences about the return to education in
the population as a whole than similar estimates from IV studies which isolate minimum age
school leavers. However that is not to say that estimates derived from the raising of the school
leaving age are unsound – only that they are less useful in drawing inference on the average
marginal return to education in the population as a whole. What the RoSLA estimates
do provide is an estimate of the return to education for those individuals who wanted to
leave full-time education at the minimum age – and from a policy point of view this is an
important parameter, especially as the Government has recently raised the education leaving
age to 17 (from 2013) and it is later to be raised to 18 (by 2015).
The return that I recover is purged of the eﬀects of ability bias and discount rate bias.
Both Card (1994, 1998) and Lang (1993) conclude from looking at the broad literature on
the eﬀect of ability bias, that ability bias if it is present has only a small biasing eﬀect, Lang
suggesting that discount rate bias dominates such that OLS estimates are biased substan-
tially downwards and Card similarly concludes that the OLS are at least 10-to-30% biased
downwards. For the body of UK estimates detailed earlier, the IV estimate is between 1.7
and 3.2 times (average 2.5) the OLS. My early smoker IV evidence is consistent with these
results – estimating the return to education controlling for ability bias and discount rate
37bias, I get an estimate that is 2.8 times the OLS estimate. Furthermore, if we believe that
ability has the same distribution amongst the high discount rate group as it is in the popu-
lation as a whole, it is more valid to generalise to the population as a whole than perhaps is
the case with using estimates recovered from instrumental variables that aﬀect only the low
educated.
9 Instrumenting Using the Raising of the School Leav-
ing Age (RoSLA)
Now to pursue this line of enquiry further, I will compare the estimate using the early
smoking instrument with an IV estimate derived using the raising of the minimum school
leaving age. The school leaving age was raised in England and Wales from 15 to 16 in 1973
such that if an individual was 16 by the end of August 1973 he/she was allowed to leave
school in the June of 1973, while if the individual was only 15 at the end of August 1973
he/she would have to remain another year at school. This means that those born after
August 1957, face a minimum school leaving age of 16. In Scotland this reform took place
in August 1976 therefore individuals born after August 1960 face a minimum school leaving
age of 16.
This information, plus an individual’s date of birth and country of residence, allows the
alternative IV estimate to be constructed. Rather than including the smoker at 16 indicator
in the ﬁrst stage regression, I include a dummy to indicate whether the individual faced
the minimum school leaving age of 1634. As I am controlling for a quadratic in year-of-
birth, the smooth changes in schooling as a result of younger cohorts generally gaining more
education is controlled for, while the identiﬁcation derives from the discontinuity induced by
the RoSLA. Figure 5 shows the proportion of individuals who have left school at or before
age 15, by year of birth, for the majority of men in my sample35. As the ﬁgure shows, there
34The minimum school leaving age was raised from 14 to 15, in 1947 for England and Wales, 1946 for
Scotland, however, in the sample of men that I use, there are only 73 individuals (3.22%) who face a minimum
school leaving age of 14 so I have concentrated on the later change to create an instrument.
35I have trimmed the sample to remove the small number of men born before 1931 and after 1970 due to
38is a steady decline in the proportion of men who have left education at 15 or before, and
though the relatively small number of men born in any single year in my data means that
it is slightly volatile36, the pattern of steady decline is evident. In year-of-birth 1958, when
the policy is in eﬀect for all individuals, we can see that there is a drop from 17.4% to 1.9%
of men leaving at or before 15. The ﬁgure remains low for the years thereafter, though with
some volatility remaining. Contrasting this is the upper line on the graph which shows the
proportion of individuals who have left at age 16 or earlier. While similarly showing a decline
as younger cohorts gain more education, the proportion who have left by or at 16 continues to
show volatility after the RoSLA, rising and falling quite sharply in places. So while the small
numbers of men born in any particular year leads to volatility in each graph, it is evident
that the RoSLA results in a discontinuity at the point in which is was implemented, and it
is from this discontinuity that I am able to construct the IV estimates using RoSLA. This is
a well established instrument, and the reduced form for log wage, including an indicator for
16 being the minimum school leaving age faced by the individual, shows that the raising of
the school leaving age is associated with a statistically signiﬁcant increase in log wage, see
Appendix Table D-1.
Table 14 contains the results for the RoSLA IV along with the OLS estimates (from Table
5). Column 1 contains the OLS results, column 2 is the result from the IV using RoSLA,
while column 3 contains the ﬁrst stage regression result using the raising of the school leaving
age as the instrument.
The main columns of interest are columns 2 and 3. Looking ﬁrst at column 3, the raising
of the school leaving age is associated with an increase in education of 0.564 years and the
coeﬃcient is precisely estimated with a robust standard error of 0.206 giving a t-statistic of
2.74. Again, it is noticeable that the R2 (0.227) is higher than has been found in similar
the small cell sizes, the graph contains the information for 83.9% of the English men in the sample. I have
excluded the small number of Scottish men for the purpose of this illustration as the RoSLA occured later
for Scotland.
36As year-of-birth increases the cell sizes increase and for the years relevant to the RoSLA the numbers
are larger.
39studies. The partial-R2 for the instrument in the ﬁrst stage is 0.0044 which is smaller than
for the early smoker instrument but is exactly the same as that found by Harmon and Walker
(1995) for their ﬁrst stage, and compares well with Bound et al. (1995). The F-statistic
on the exclusion of the instrument from the ﬁrst stage is 7.49. While this is below Staiger
and Stock’s (1997) rule-of-thumb guide of 10, taken with the partial R2, the overall picture
is not of a weak instrument. Moreover, using the Fuller(1) estimator – which is the most
robust to the presence of a potentially weak instrument introducing bias to the coeﬃcient
on the endogenous variable – the result is almost identical (see Appendix Table C-2). The
size of the average increase in education, controlling for other covariates in the ﬁrst stage, is
comparable with that found by Harmon and Walker (1995) (0.54 years for the 1947 RoSLA),
and slightly larger than that found by Oreopoulos (2006)(0.44 years for the 1947 RoSLA).
Turning to column 2, we see that the estimated return to schooling is 10.2% when we
instrument using RoSLA. This is more than double the size of the OLS return though below
the other IV estimate. However it is not as precisely estimated, the robust standard error is
0.051 giving a t-statistic of 1.99, the p-value of this t-statistic is 0.046 thus it is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level.
Again, as a robustness check to verify that the inclusion of the parental characteristics
variables are not driving the result, Table 15 displays the results for the more basic speciﬁca-
tion excluding these background variables. In this more basic speciﬁcation, the instrument
is actually strengthened, the F-statistic on the exclusion of the instrument from the ﬁrst
stage increasing to 9.98 (much closer to Staiger and Stock’s rule-of-thumb of 10) and the
partial R2 of the instrument is 0.0058 (increased from 0.0044 in the main speciﬁcation), and
the overall ﬁrst stage R2 is 0.113. The eﬀect on the estimated return to education is minor
– reducing from 10.2% to 10.0%, with a robust standard error of 0.042 giving a t-statistic of
2.41, making the estimate signﬁcant at the 5% level (p-value 0.016). Thus again the inclu-
sion of parental characteristic variables is not driving the result. More importantly, in this
speciﬁcation the instrument is almost exactly attaining Staiger and Stock’s threshold for a
40non-weak instrument and the estimated coeﬃcient on years of schooling is almost identical
to the main speciﬁcation case, when the F-statistic was only 7.49. This suggests that there
is no bias in the estimated coeﬃcient on years of schooling in the main speciﬁcation.
The question is whether this is evidence that using an institutional change – such as the
raising of the school leaving age – to form an instrument isolates the return to schooling
for only a speciﬁc group that is heavily weighted towards the low ability or those with high
discount rate particularly because of ﬁnancial constraints?
If the group whose return is identiﬁed by the RoSLA instrument (which is by deﬁnition
a low education group) is comprised mainly of individuals of low ability rather than those
who have high discount rates because of poor access to ﬁnance, then we would expect that
the return for this group would be lower than the return we ﬁnd with the smoker at 16
instrument – as I have demonstrated that individuals of all abilities are in the early smokers
group. The imprecision of the estimate using RoSLA does not allow me to conclude that
the estimate is deﬁnitely smaller than the smoking at 16 IV estimate, however one test
of the extent to which RoSLA aﬀects individuals of diﬀerent abilities is to repeat the ﬁrst
stage regressions by quintile of the log wage residual distribution that I used to illustrate
the eﬀect of smoking at 16 on educational attainment in all quintiles of the distribution.
The results from these regressions are in right hand section of Table 8. If the contention is
that RoSLA aﬀects primarily low ability individuals then we would expect that the eﬀect
would be quantitatively larger for the lowest quintiles of the log wage residual distribution
but falling in size and signiﬁcance as we move up the distribution.
Table 8 illustrates that the raising of the minimum school leaving age increases the
number of years of schooling by 1.04 years in the lowest quintile, which is 8.4% of the mean
number of years schooling for this group. Being almost exactly 1 year extra education this
suggests that in this lower quintile of the (proxy) ability distribution, all the individuals
wished to leave school at the minimum age. In the second lowest quintile RoSLA increases
the number of years of schooling by 0.84 years which is 6.9% of the mean for this group.
41In the three quintiles above this the increase in education associated with RoSLA is much
smaller in absolute and relative terms than in both of the lowest two quintiles but in none
of these higher quintiles is the dummy for minimum school leaving age of 16 close to being
statistically signiﬁcant.
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the low education group aﬀected by
RoSLA are generally lower ability – if they were mainly high discount rate then we would
expect to see a similar eﬀect across the log wage residual distribution.
The contention that the RoSLA group is weighted more towards low ability rather than
high discount rate individuals is supported by Carneiro and Heckman (2002). They ﬁnd
that in the US, only 8% of American youths are credit constrained to the point that it
aﬀects their post-secondary schooling. Moreover, they ﬁnd that when ability is controlled
for responses to tuition costs are uniform across income groups. Low family income at the
time when decisions over post-secondary education are made does not appear to be a major
constraint in the US. Two recent studies in the UK have indicated that credit constraints
do not prevent individuals from participating in higher education. Chowdry et al. (2008)
use a unique dataset from a cohort comprising all state school pupils who were in the ﬁnal
year of compulsory schooling in England in 2001-2002. These students have been followed
from age 11 through to their higher education participation decision at age 18 (in 2004-05)
or age 19 (2005-06). The results indicate that conditional on prior attainment, there is no
diﬀerence in higher (university) education participation rates between children of higher and
lower socio-economic status (SES) – illustrating for the UK, what Carneiro and Heckman
ﬁnd for the US. Similarly, Dearden et al. (2008) study the eﬀect of alterations to the funding
of higher education in England – with the introduction of fees and indeed top-up fees. They
ﬁnd that participation rates among the lower SES groups have not declined following the
introduction of tuition fees (due to the provision of loans by the government to pay the fees),
which again supports the contention that the RoSLA group in this country are not credit
constrained.
42If it was the case that those aﬀected by RoSLA are high discount rate rather than low
ability, the IV results which use RoSLA could well be higher than the OLS estimates. How-
ever, the evidence above and these conclusions from the Carneiro and Heckman, Chowdry
et al. and Dearden et al. papers suggest that it is more likely to be the case that the group
identiﬁed by RoSLA are individuals of low ability rather than high discount rate. Though
the imprecision of the RoSLA IV estimate prevents a concrete conclusion that it is indeed
lower, comparing the RoSLA IV result with the early smoking IV estimate suggests that the
RoSLA group are lower ability as the RoSLA IV estimates a lower return. This, and the
results from looking at where in the proxy ability distribution each instrument is working,
supports the contention that it is more appropriate to generalise from the early smoking IV
estimate to the rest of the population: as unlike RoSLA, the estimate is not capturing a
LATE that is primarily a lower ability group.
10 Testing of the Instruments
Having more than one instrument means that I have an over-identiﬁed system – more moment
conditions than are necessary to identify the parameters of the model – which means that I
can test the instruments to establish whether the exclusion restrictions are valid. In other
studies, such as Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Evans and Montgomery (1994), multiple
instruments are used and tested. In each of these cases however, they essentially only have
one mechanism to generate the exogenous variation in education: including interactions
of that mechanism (the instrument) with other variables does not entail genuinely having
multiple instruments. If the mechanism is not valid then none of the ‘instruments’ are valid,
the problem being that the Hansen J-test of the exclusion restrictions involves assuming one
of the instruments is valid in order to test the others.
On the contrary, I have two independent sources of exogenous variation in education
and so can genuinely test the validity of the exclusion restrictions. As Murray (2006a,b)
points out, the Hansen test is more compelling when one of the instruments is thought to
43be deﬁnitely valid, and I believe that I am in this situation: there is a strong argument to
suggest that the RoSLA instrument is valid as it was an exogenous (to the individual) policy
change.
Instrumenting using both the early smoking instrument and the minimum school leaving
age instrument and then performing the Hansen J-test results in a test statistic of 0.202,
p-value 0.6529, which is a comprehensive failure to reject the null hypothesis that the instru-
ments are valid37. The ﬁrst stage R2 is high at 0.250 and the F-statistic on the exclusion
of the instruments is 36.83 with a partial R2 on the instruments of 0.0332, all of which
suggests that the instruments are strong as well as valid. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F-statistic indicates that the Stock-Yogo tests of weak identiﬁcation are easily passed (i.e.
no weak instrument problem)38. Furthermore, the high F and R2 statistics suggest that the
bias inherent in IV estimation in ﬁnite samples will be smaller than the OLS bias39. Using
the Fuller(1) LIML estimator, the results are almost identical (see Table C-3), and again all
weak instrument tests are comprehensively passed.
The Hansen J test provides compelling statistical evidence for the validity of the early
smoking instrument, which earlier evidence has shown to be a strong instrument. Further-
more, in order to re-enforce the evidence of the Hansen test, it can be decomposed to illus-
trate directly the validity of the early smoker instrument speciﬁcally: by using the RoSLA
instrument to just identify the system of equations and then taking these valid estimates of
the error from the structural equation and regressing them on the early smoker instrument.
The results of such an exercise are contained in Appendix Table D-2. As can be seen, there
is no relationship between the residuals from the structural equation and the early smoker
37Moreover it is well known that the Hansen test rejects too often i.e. it rejects the null that the instruments
are valid in cases where it should not, thus such a strong failure to reject suggests we are far from the rejection
region, re-enforcing the validity of the instruments.
38Though the correct critical values for this test are not tabulated in the case where standard errors are
clustered, using the critical values for the i.i.d. case or the Staiger and Stock rule-of-thumb indicates strong
instruments.
39The ratio of the ﬁnite sample biases of 2SLS and OLS is ≈ l
nR2
1 where l is the number of instruments
and R2
1 is the R2 from the ﬁrst stage of the 2SLS (see Murray, 2006b). In my estimation l =2, n =21256
and R2 =0.250, such that the 2SLS ﬁnite sample bias is a fraction of the OLS ﬁnite sample bias.
44indicator40.
Finally, an alternative IV regression can be run in which RoSLA is used as the identifying
instrument, while the early smoker indicator is included as one of the X variables. Appendix
Table D-3 shows the coeﬃcient estimates when this exercise is carried out. As can be seen,
while early smoking aﬀects education in the ﬁrst stage (with a coeﬃcient almost identical
to the other speciﬁcations in which it is used as an instrument) it is completely insigniﬁ-
cant in the structural equation. This evidence supports the contention that early smoking
aﬀects choice of education, conditional on the other variables in X, but then has no further
independent eﬀect on log wage. All of these results suggest that early smoking is both a
strong and valid instrument. The evidence indicates that discount rate, as captured by
early smoking, aﬀects human capital accumulation, however once that has been controlled
for in the structural equation, there is no remaining eﬀect of discount rate on wage.
Returning to the estimation results when using both RoSLA and early smoking as in-
struments, Table 16 shows that the coeﬃcient on each instrument in the ﬁrst stage is almost
identical to the case when the instruments are used separately, and the estimated return to
education using both instruments together is 12.5% with a robust standard error of 0.019
giving a t-statistic of 6.66. The standard error is lower than is the case when either of the
instruments are used singly, so the extra variation in schooling that comes with using both
instruments results in a more precise estimate of the IV return to education, as we would
expect.
The problem with this strategy is that using both instruments makes the interpretation
‘ugly’, to borrow Murray’s parlance. Though I am exploiting two sources of exogenous
variation in years-of-schooling, which is good for identiﬁcation, the problem is interpreting
exactly whose return the resulting LATE estimator is capturing. It is not as straightforward
as in the individual instruments cases in which we identify the low ability/high discount rate
40It is worth noting that strong instruments that are ‘almost valid’ bias 2SLS estimates only a little, thus
even if there was any remaining doubt regarding even a small correlation between the early smoker instrument
and the structural equation error term, the overwhelming strength of the instrument would suggest any bias
would be very small, see Murray (2006b).
45individuals’ return – using RoSLA – or the high discount rate (because of time preference)
individuals’ return – using early smoking. Given that the eﬀects of each instrument in the
ﬁrst stage are similar to their impacts when used separately, and that the early smoking
instrument is the stronger and the resulting IV estimate of the return is very close to the
early smoking IV estimate, it appears that this instrument is doing most of the work. In
interpretation this would suggest the estimate is more heavily weighted towards the return
for the individuals who have high discount rates because of their rate of time preference.
11 Conclusions
I have presented three IV estimates: the RoSLA estimate of 10.2%, the combined estimate
of 12.5%, and the early smoking estimate of 12.9%, all of which whilst being statistically
signiﬁcant are suﬃciently imprecise for me to be unable to conclude are actually diﬀerent
from each other. My analysis, looking at the eﬀects on diﬀerent quintiles of the proxy ability
distribution, suggests that the RoSLA estimate captures the return for the individuals who
wanted to leave at the minimum leaving age but were forced to stay longer – concurring
with the earlier evidence of Oreopoulos, Chevalier et al. and Harmon and Walker. I have
argued that early smoking is a behaviour engaged in by individuals of all abilities who have
high discount rates due to their rate of time preference, thus the IV estimate derived from
this instrument is closer to an average marginal return to education, purged of the bias of
OLS. Importantly, exploiting the over-identiﬁcation, I have demonstrated that using early
smoking behaviour allows the construction of a valid instrumental variables estimate of the
return to education.
That both the RoSLA and early smoking IV estimates are not statistically diﬀerent to
each other suggests that the RoSLA LATE is also close to an average marginal return to
education i.e. that the returns at the lower part of the distribution are similar to the average
return. This follows Oreopoulos who ﬁnds a return substantially higher than the estimated
OLS return when implementing IV esitmates based on RoSLA, and a RoSLA that aﬀected
46a large proportion of the population.
This leaves a question of why we get a similar estimated return for the RoSLA and early
smoking groups, despite the fact that the groups have diﬀering distributions of ability and
levels of education i.e. they are capturing diﬀerent LATEs. I believe that the results that
this and other IV studies ﬁnd can be reconciled when we consider the assumptions imposed
by Mincer’s human capital earnings function as I (and others) have estimated it. Implicit
in this speciﬁcation is the assumption that each additional year of schooling has the same
proportional eﬀect on earnings i.e. concavity in the schooling-wage proﬁle is not modelled.
Moreover, in interpreting IV estimates we need explicitly recognise that returns to education
vary across the population depending on individual characteristics (the βi vary). If diﬀerent
individuals have diﬀerent returns to schooling at the same level of schooling and if each
individual’s return to schooling is strictly decreasing in their level of schooling, then there is
no unique causal eﬀect of schooling.
While some authors41 have concentrated on “sheep-skin” eﬀects creating non-linearities
in the returns to education, Lang (1993) ﬁnds a diminishing marginal product of education
i.e. concavity in the education-wage proﬁle. The individuals aﬀected by RoSLA may be
of lower ability, however, if all individuals have a higher marginal return to schooling at
lower levels of schooling then this is consistent with the estimate from the RoSLA IV being
higher than the OLS estimate. Similarly, though the smoking at 16 group have all levels of
education, some higher than the minimum that the RoSLA individuals have by deﬁnition,
there is more weight in the lower part of the schooling distribution among early smokers
and so the the average marginal return across these individuals will be weighted towards
the RoSLA estimate. Thus in this light it is perhaps unsurprising that both the smoking
instrument and the RoSLA instrument result in estimates of the return to education that
are similar to each other.
More generally there is the question of why the OLS estimates are consistently found to
41For example, Park (1999) has looked at “sheep-skin” eﬀects in the US.
47be below IV estimates – irrespective of the instrument chosen – when, as noted above, mea-
surement error in standard micro surveys could only sensibly account for a relatively small
attenuation in the OLS coeﬃcient and moreover it appears from this study that ‘discount
rate bias’ is not a major factor biasing the OLS estimates downwards. The ‘discount rate
bias’ story suggests that the eﬀect of discount rate to reduce education also independently
increases wages. However, when I test for the correlation between the discount rate (as
captured by early smoking) and the wage error the instrument is shown to be valid. Hence I
do not believe that ‘discount rate bias’ is the major factor biasing the OLS estimates down-
wards. Given that all instruments estimate a ‘local average treatment eﬀect’, which may or
may not be diﬀerent to the average eﬀect on the treated, it appears that the instruments
that have commonly been used – and the two that I use here – isolate the treatment eﬀect
for groups of individuals who are located at point(s) in the education distribution at which
there is a higher average return to education than the global average estimated by OLS.
Support for this conclusion also comes from Oreopoulos (2006) who estimates that when the
OLS is carried out only for those who left school at 16 or less, the estimated coeﬃcient is
similar to his IV estimates which use RoSLA. If I replicate this approach and estimate the
OLS regression only for those who left school at the minimum age the estimated return is
19.7%. Whilst acknowledging that the endogeneity of years of schooling in this regression
is not dealt with, the much greater coeﬃcient on years of schooling does suggest that the
linearity in returns assumption of the OLS when estimated over the entire range of education
levels contributes signiﬁcantly to the lowering of the OLS coeﬃcient.
One conclusion is that in modelling the returns to education, while the endogeneity of
schooling is clearly a problem, it is important to recognize that there are also issues regarding
the appropriateness of the linearity assumption and the reality of heterogeneous returns to
education across individuals. Thus for policy purposes in particular, it may not even be
appropriate to refer to the causal eﬀect of education on earnings. In answering the question
of the return, we may need to focus on the individuals in question and the margin in question
48before we can arrive at a valid answer.
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5412 Tables
Table 1: Eﬀect of schooling on probability of Current and Early Smoking
Current Smoker Smoker at 16
marginal fx z marginal fx z x-bar
years of schooling −0.027∗∗∗ −7.24 −0.038∗∗∗ −8.38 12.306
age 0.005 1.35 0.002 0.50 42.374
age2 0.000∗∗∗ −2.99 0.000 −0.36 1939.210
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗∗ −2.66 −0.002 −0.30 59.190 (=1955)
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 2.84 0.000 0.25 3647.300
region: North −0.032 −0.76 −0.033 −0.66 0.066
region: Yorkshire 0.037 0.99 0.031 0.69 0.098
region: North West 0.037 0.97 0.031 0.69 0.104
region: East Midlands 0.056 1.46 0.060 1.30 0.094
region: East Anglia 0.047 1.05 0.112∗ 1.94 0.043
region: South East 0.055∗ 1.72 0.047 1.23 0.285
region: South West −0.005 −0.12 0.059 1.29 0.097
region: Wales 0.062 1.36 0.006 0.11 0.053
region: Scotland 0.065 1.57 0.063 1.28 0.078
ethnicity: Black −0.121 −1.27 −0.181 −1.39 0.006
ethnicity: Asian 0.225∗∗∗ 3.18 −0.176∗∗ −2.29 0.016
ethnicity: Other −0.016 −0.16 −0.174 −1.55 0.008
father’s occ class: 1 −0.022 −0.74 −0.041 −1.17 0.141
father’s occ class: 2 −0.094∗∗ −2.39 −0.094∗ −1.88 0.058
father’s occ class: 3 0.013 0.28 −0.099∗ −1.81 0.035
father’s occ class: 4 −0.055 −1.28 −0.104∗∗ −2.10 0.047
father’s occ class: 5 0.012 0.46 −0.010 −0.33 0.236
father’s occ class: 6 0.022 0.49 −0.089∗ −1.79 0.042
father’s occ class: 7 0.006 0.13 −0.002 −0.03 0.032
father’s occ class: 9 0.009 0.29 0.016 0.43 0.094
father’s occ class: 10 −0.012 −0.39 −0.056∗ −1.67 0.151
mother’s occ class: 1 −0.017 −0.33 −0.026 −0.39 0.037
mother’s occ class: 2 0.070 1.07 0.003 0.04 0.027
mother’s occ class: 3 −0.050 −0.87 −0.036 −0.51 0.030
mother’s occ class: 4 −0.036 −0.84 −0.023 −0.42 0.089
mother’s occ class: 5 −0.023 −0.41 0.048 0.67 0.028
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.51 0.036 0.62 0.068
mother’s occ class: 7 −0.054 −1.16 −0.083 −1.48 0.060
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.017 −0.39 −0.057 −1.08 0.083
mother’s occ class: 10 −0.012 −0.33 −0.060 −1.29 0.532
‘nuclear family’ to 16 −0.062∗∗∗ −2.86 −0.099∗∗∗ −3.73 0.820
mid 1990s 0.002 0.22 0.000 0.06 0.223
late 1990s 0.037∗∗∗ 2.90 0.035∗∗∗ 2.85 0.200
post 2000 −0.006 −0.30 0.002 0.08 0.371
# individuals 2805 2805
# observations 33298 33298
obs. prob. 0.287 0.344
pred. prob. (at x-bar) 0.276 0.331
Notes: Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table 2: Smokers at 16/18 by quintile of the mean log wage residual distribution
Non-smoker Smoker Non-smoker Smoker
quintile at 16 at 16 Total at 18 at 18 Total
1 256 198 454 209 245 454
56.39% 43.61% 100.00% 46.04% 53.96% 100.00%
2 278 175 453 216 237 453
61.37% 38.63% 100.00% 47.68% 52.32% 100.00%
3 319 134 453 265 188 453
70.42% 29.58% 100.00% 58.50% 41.50% 100.00%
4 299 154 453 255 198 453
66.00% 34.00% 100.00% 56.29% 43.71% 100.00%
5 349 104 453 295 158 453
77.04% 22.96% 100.00% 65.12% 34.88% 100.00%
Total 1501 765 2266 1240 1026 2266
66.24% 33.76% 100.00% 54.72% 45.28% 100.00%
Notes: OLS log wage regression (Table 5 column 1) run on pooled panel dataset, residuals are
taken and the mean residual for each individual is calculated. These are then ranked into
5 quintiles as a measure of unobserved ability.
56Table 3: Sample Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
log wage 21256 2.214 0.437 0.848 3.407
years of schooling 21256 12.507 2.646 7 21
smoker at age 16 21256 0.315 0.465 0 1
minimum school leaving age was 16 21256 0.537 0.499 0 1
age 21256 39.991 10.757 19 65
cohort: born in the 1920s 21256 0.003 0.052 0 1
cohort: born in the 1930s 21256 0.050 0.219 0 1
cohort: born in the 1940s 21256 0.203 0.402 0 1
cohort: born in the 1950s 21256 0.274 0.446 0 1
cohort: born in the 1960s 21256 0.319 0.466 0 1
cohort: born in the 1970s 21256 0.146 0.354 0 1
cohort: born in the 1980s 21256 0.005 0.069 0 1
region: North 21256 0.068 0.252 0 1
region: Yorkshire 21256 0.097 0.296 0 1
region: North West 21256 0.106 0.308 0 1
region: East Midlands 21256 0.092 0.290 0 1
region: East Anglia 21256 0.043 0.202 0 1
region: South East 21256 0.280 0.449 0 1
region: South West 21256 0.100 0.300 0 1
region: Wales 21256 0.051 0.221 0 1
region: Scotland 21256 0.076 0.265 0 1
ethnicity: Black 21256 0.004 0.062 0 1
ethnicity: Asian 21256 0.016 0.124 0 1
ethnicity: Other 21256 0.007 0.083 0 1
father’s occ class: 1 21256 0.139 0.346 0 1
father’s occ class: 2 21256 0.064 0.244 0 1
father’s occ class: 3 21256 0.038 0.191 0 1
father’s occ class: 4 21256 0.049 0.216 0 1
father’s occ class: 5 21256 0.234 0.423 0 1
father’s occ class: 6 21256 0.044 0.205 0 1
father’s occ class: 7 21256 0.032 0.177 0 1
father’s occ class: 8 21256 0.171 0.377 0 1
father’s occ class: 9 21256 0.086 0.280 0 1
father’s occ class: 10 21256 0.143 0.350 0 1
mother’s occ class: 1 21256 0.037 0.188 0 1
mother’s occ class: 2 21256 0.026 0.159 0 1
mother’s occ class: 3 21256 0.032 0.175 0 1
mother’s occ class: 4 21256 0.098 0.297 0 1
mother’s occ class: 5 21256 0.029 0.168 0 1
mother’s occ class: 6 21256 0.073 0.260 0 1
mother’s occ class: 7 21256 0.066 0.248 0 1
mother’s occ class: 8 21256 0.051 0.220 0 1
mother’s occ class: 9 21256 0.084 0.277 0 1
mother’s occ class: 10 21256 0.505 0.500 0 1
‘nuclear family’ to 16 21256 0.831 0.375 0 1
early 1990s 21256 0.195 0.396 0 1
mid 1990s 21256 0.213 0.409 0 1
late 1990s 21256 0.221 0.415 0 1
post 2000 21256 0.371 0.483 0 1
number of observations per person 2266 9.380 4.516 1 15
Notes: ‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Occupational class dummies: (1) management, (2) professional,
(3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales,
(8) plant/machine operative, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table 4: Sample Summary Statistics, by Early Smoking Status
Smoker at 16 Non-Smoker at 16
Std. Std.
Variable Obs Mean Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Dev. Min Max
log wage 6696 2.120 0.423 0.878 3.395 14560 2.257 0.437 0.848 3.407
years of schooling 6696 11.646 2.081 8 21 14560 12.902 2.781 7 21
smoker at age 16 6696 1.000 0.000 1 1 14560 0.000 0.000 0 0
min. sch leaving age 16 6696 0.486 0.500 0 1 14560 0.561 0.496 0 1
age 6696 41.230 11.337 19 65 14560 39.421 10.431 19 65
cohort: born in the 1920s 6696 0.004 0.063 0 1 14560 0.002 0.046 0 1
cohort: born in the 1930s 6696 0.063 0.244 0 1 14560 0.044 0.206 0 1
cohort: born in the 1940s 6696 0.258 0.438 0 1 14560 0.177 0.382 0 1
cohort: born in the 1950s 6696 0.250 0.433 0 1 14560 0.284 0.451 0 1
cohort: born in the 1960s 6696 0.266 0.442 0 1 14560 0.344 0.475 0 1
cohort: born in the 1970s 6696 0.150 0.357 0 1 14560 0.145 0.352 0 1
cohort: born in the 1980s 6696 0.008 0.091 0 1 14560 0.003 0.057 0 1
region: North 6696 0.057 0.231 0 1 14560 0.073 0.260 0 1
region: Yorkshire 6696 0.103 0.304 0 1 14560 0.095 0.293 0 1
region: North West 6696 0.103 0.303 0 1 14560 0.107 0.309 0 1
region: East Midlands 6696 0.095 0.293 0 1 14560 0.091 0.288 0 1
region: East Anglia 6696 0.050 0.219 0 1 14560 0.039 0.193 0 1
region: South East 6696 0.272 0.445 0 1 14560 0.284 0.451 0 1
region: South West 6696 0.119 0.324 0 1 14560 0.091 0.288 0 1
region: Wales 6696 0.044 0.204 0 1 14560 0.055 0.228 0 1
region: Scotland 6696 0.082 0.274 0 1 14560 0.074 0.261 0 1
ethnicity: Black 6696 0.001 0.037 0 1 14560 0.005 0.070 0 1
ethnicity: Asian 6696 0.006 0.075 0 1 14560 0.020 0.140 0 1
ethnicity: Other 6696 0.002 0.049 0 1 14560 0.009 0.094 0 1
father’s occ class: 1 6696 0.123 0.329 0 1 14560 0.146 0.353 0 1
father’s occ class: 2 6696 0.036 0.185 0 1 14560 0.077 0.266 0 1
father’s occ class: 3 6696 0.027 0.161 0 1 14560 0.043 0.203 0 1
father’s occ class: 4 6696 0.032 0.177 0 1 14560 0.057 0.231 0 1
father’s occ class: 5 6696 0.257 0.437 0 1 14560 0.223 0.416 0 1
father’s occ class: 6 6696 0.036 0.187 0 1 14560 0.048 0.213 0 1
father’s occ class: 7 6696 0.036 0.187 0 1 14560 0.031 0.172 0 1
father’s occ class: 8 6696 0.194 0.396 0 1 14560 0.161 0.367 0 1
father’s occ class: 9 6696 0.113 0.316 0 1 14560 0.074 0.261 0 1
father’s occ class: 10 6696 0.146 0.353 0 1 14560 0.142 0.349 0 1
mother’s occ class: 1 6696 0.031 0.173 0 1 14560 0.039 0.195 0 1
mother’s occ class: 2 6696 0.018 0.134 0 1 14560 0.030 0.169 0 1
mother’s occ class: 3 6696 0.028 0.166 0 1 14560 0.033 0.179 0 1
mother’s occ class: 4 6696 0.085 0.279 0 1 14560 0.104 0.305 0 1
mother’s occ class: 5 6696 0.043 0.204 0 1 14560 0.023 0.148 0 1
mother’s occ class: 6 6696 0.098 0.297 0 1 14560 0.062 0.240 0 1
mother’s occ class: 7 6696 0.051 0.221 0 1 14560 0.072 0.259 0 1
mother’s occ class: 8 6696 0.053 0.223 0 1 14560 0.050 0.218 0 1
mother’s occ class: 9 6696 0.092 0.288 0 1 14560 0.080 0.272 0 1
mother’s occ class: 10 6696 0.501 0.500 0 1 14560 0.507 0.500 0 1
‘nuclear family’ to 16 6696 0.795 0.404 0 1 14560 0.848 0.359 0 1
early 1990s 6696 0.196 0.397 0 1 14560 0.194 0.396 0 1
mid 1990s 6696 0.212 0.409 0 1 14560 0.214 0.410 0 1
late 1990s 6696 0.219 0.414 0 1 14560 0.222 0.415 0 1
post 2000 6696 0.373 0.484 0 1 14560 0.371 0.483 0 1
# obs. per person 765 8.753 4.650 1 15 1501 9.700 4.414 1 15
Notes: ‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Occupational class dummies: (1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical,
(4) clerical/secretarial, (5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales,
(8) plant/machine operative, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table 5: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status
OLS IV: smoker at 16 IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.754∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.607∗∗ 0.287 −0.471 1.664
years of schooling 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.129∗∗∗ 0.020 — — — —
smoker at 16 indicator — — — — — — — — −0.876∗∗∗ 0.108
age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.094∗∗∗ 0.005 0.056∗∗∗ 0.022
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗ 0.007 −0.052∗∗∗ 0.011 0.398∗∗∗ 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.054 0.044 −0.103 0.272
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 −0.022 0.041 0.331 0.253
region: North West 0.054∗ 0.032 0.023 0.040 0.402 0.253
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.032 −0.005 0.038 −0.034 0.235
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 −0.009 0.048 0.366 0.324
region: South East 0.142∗∗∗ 0.028 0.082∗∗ 0.037 0.757∗∗∗ 0.206
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.015 0.041 0.175 0.237
region: Wales −0.012 0.040 −0.019 0.045 0.081 0.285
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 −0.021 0.044 0.643∗∗ 0.262
ethnicity: Black 0.114 0.105 0.115 0.117 −0.164 0.779
ethnicity: Asian −0.136∗ 0.071 −0.312∗∗∗ 0.105 1.965∗∗∗ 0.485
ethnicity: Other −0.048 0.103 −0.234∗∗ 0.119 2.067∗ 1.111
father’s occ class: 1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.028 0.020 0.041 1.122∗∗∗ 0.214
father’s occ class: 2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.077 0.065 2.268∗∗∗ 0.291
father’s occ class: 3 0.089∗∗ 0.043 −0.043 0.058 1.499∗∗∗ 0.321
father’s occ class: 4 0.065∗ 0.036 −0.053 0.051 1.320∗∗∗ 0.305
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.023 0.011 0.028 0.335∗∗ 0.170
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 −0.074 0.048 0.991∗∗∗ 0.305
father’s occ class: 7 0.103∗∗∗ 0.040 0.066 0.049 0.467 0.330
father’s occ class: 9 −0.021 0.029 0.028 0.035 −0.551∗∗∗ 0.197
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.030 −0.012 0.186
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.035 0.061 0.112 0.411
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 −0.103 0.070 1.433∗∗∗ 0.439
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.053 0.057 0.046 0.387
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.014 0.048 0.485 0.307
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.031 0.058 −0.117 0.417
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.029 0.045 0.054 0.311
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.057 0.048 −0.083 0.312
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.004 0.038 0.034 0.044 −0.461 0.284
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 −0.006 0.036 0.115 0.253
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 0.001 0.022 0.247∗ 0.136
mid 1990s −0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.010 0.067 0.046
late 1990s −0.065∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.070∗∗∗ 0.016 0.080 0.081
post 2000 −0.033 0.021 −0.040∗ 0.023 0.108 0.126
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.072 0.246
F-test on exclusion of smoking at 16 from ﬁrst stage: 66.17; Partial R2 of instrument = 0.0289
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table 6: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status, Basic Speciﬁcation
OLS IV: smoker at 16 IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.849∗∗∗ 0.247 −0.590∗∗ 0.280 −2.204 1.697
years of schooling 0.052∗∗∗ 0.003 0.121∗∗∗ 0.016 — — — —
smoker at 16 indicator — — — — — — — — −1.087∗∗∗ 0.113
age 0.098∗∗∗ 0.004 0.094∗∗∗ 0.005 0.067∗∗∗ 0.023
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.014∗∗ 0.007 −0.048∗∗∗ 0.011 0.466∗∗∗ 0.042
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.004 0.000
region: North 0.041 0.038 0.048 0.044 −0.124 0.286
region: Yorkshire −0.003 0.033 −0.018 0.039 0.269 0.265
region: North West 0.050 0.033 0.022 0.039 0.432 0.270
region: East Midlands −0.016 0.032 −0.006 0.037 −0.122 0.258
region: East Anglia 0.010 0.040 −0.006 0.047 0.318 0.338
region: South East 0.143∗∗∗ 0.028 0.080∗∗∗ 0.036 0.946∗∗∗ 0.219
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.010 0.040 0.271 0.251
region: Wales −0.018 0.040 −0.019 0.044 0.003 0.305
region: Scotland 0.020 0.036 −0.023 0.043 0.688∗∗ 0.283
ethnicity: Black 0.117 0.093 0.104 0.113 −0.015 0.751
ethnicity: Asian −0.150∗∗ 0.070 −0.290∗∗∗ 0.098 1.844∗∗∗ 0.519
ethnicity: Other −0.042 0.095 −0.221∗ 0.119 2.406∗∗ 0.996
mid 1990s −0.047∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.049∗∗∗ 0.010 0.040 0.050
late 1990s −0.068∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.068∗∗∗ 0.016 0.019 0.086
post 2000 −0.038∗ 0.021 −0.037 0.023 0.014 0.133
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.251 0.098 0.143
F-test on exclusion of instrument from ﬁrst stage: 92.39; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0400
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
60Table 7: First Stage IV regression coeﬃcients using Smoker at 16 indicator interacted with
year turned 16 indicator
Robust
Coeﬀ. Std. Err. t p
Smoker at 16 × turned 16 pre-1965 −0.797∗∗∗ 0.209 −3.82 0.000
Smoker at 16 × turned 16 post-1965 −0.904∗∗∗ 0.120 −7.51 0.000
# observations 21256
R2 0.247
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at 1% level; standard errors clustered at individual level and robust.
Turned 16 post-1965 includes those turning 16 from January 1965 onwards.
Other covariates included in these ﬁrst stage regressions are those in Table 5.
61Table 8: First Stage IV Regression coeﬃcients on Smoker at 16 indicator and on Minimum
School Leaving Age of 16 indicator, by quintile of the mean log wage residual distribution
IV ﬁrst stage, Early Smoking IV ﬁrst stage, RoSLA
Coeﬀ. on Robust Coeﬀ. on Robust
quintile smoker 16 Std. Err. R2 MSLA=16 Std. Err. R2
1 -0.773*** 0.265 0.268 1.044** 0.510 0.262
#obs = 3684
mean years of schooling
12.41
2 -1.044*** 0.227 0.317 0.837* 0.458 0.292
#obs = 4285
mean years of schooling
12.09
3 -0.950*** 0.249 0.329 0.315 0.496 0.309
#obs = 4461
mean years of schooling
12.30
4 -0.747*** 0.213 0.257 0.398 0.388 0.240
#obs = 4496
mean years of schooling
12.28
5 -0.879*** 0.241 0.341 0.080 0.435 0.321
#obs = 4330
mean years of schooling
12.65
Notes: *** signﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, * signiﬁcant at 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
Other covariates included in regressions are as Table 5.
62Table 9: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 18
Status
OLS IV: smoker at 18 IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.754∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.596∗∗ 0.293 −0.399 1.675
years of schooling 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.135∗∗∗ 0.023 — — — —
smoker at 18 indicator — — — — — — — — −0.745∗∗∗ 0.108
age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.093∗∗∗ 0.005 0.054∗∗ 0.022
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗ 0.007 −0.054∗∗∗ 0.012 0.399∗∗∗ 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.054 0.045 −0.121 0.274
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 −0.024 0.042 0.319 0.254
region: North West 0.054∗ 0.032 0.020 0.041 0.414 0.253
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.032 −0.005 0.038 −0.041 0.236
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 −0.011 0.050 0.392 0.324
region: South East 0.142∗∗∗ 0.028 0.077∗∗ 0.039 0.760∗∗∗ 0.209
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.014 0.042 0.138 0.238
region: Wales −0.012 0.040 −0.020 0.046 0.063 0.287
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 −0.025 0.046 0.600∗∗ 0.264
ethnicity: Black 0.114 0.105 0.115 0.119 −0.212 0.774
ethnicity: Asian −0.136∗ 0.071 −0.325∗∗∗ 0.112 2.081∗∗∗ 0.511
ethnicity: Other −0.048 0.103 −0.248∗∗ 0.124 2.112∗ 1.091
father’s occ class: 1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.028 0.013 0.044 1.160∗∗∗ 0.213
father’s occ class: 2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.092 0.071 2.327∗∗∗ 0.292
father’s occ class: 3 0.089∗∗ 0.043 −0.053 0.063 1.514∗∗∗ 0.326
father’s occ class: 4 0.065∗ 0.036 −0.062 0.054 1.362∗∗∗ 0.309
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.023 0.009 0.029 0.340∗∗ 0.170
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 −0.081 0.051 0.983∗∗∗ 0.308
father’s occ class: 7 0.103∗∗∗ 0.040 0.063 0.050 0.493 0.329
father’s occ class: 9 −0.021 0.029 0.032 0.036 −0.551∗∗∗ 0.196
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.031 −0.008 0.186
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.034 0.063 0.062 0.411
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 −0.112 0.074 1.352∗∗∗ 0.443
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.053 0.059 0.074 0.388
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.011 0.050 0.471 0.310
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.033 0.060 −0.199 0.420
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.029 0.046 0.021 0.313
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.058 0.049 −0.113 0.313
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.004 0.038 0.037 0.046 −0.489∗ 0.287
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 −0.007 0.037 0.088 0.256
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 −0.001 0.022 0.258∗ 0.135
mid 1990s −0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.010 0.066 0.046
late 1990s −0.065∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.070∗∗∗ 0.016 0.079 0.082
post 2000 −0.033 0.021 −0.040∗ 0.024 0.100 0.127
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.042 0.242
F-test on exclusion of smoking at 18 from ﬁrst stage: 48.02; Partial R2 of instrument = 0.0236
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table 10: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 15
Status
OLS IV: smoker at 15 IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.754∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.609∗∗ 0.287 −1.636 1.663
years of schooling 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.128∗∗∗ 0.023 — — — —
smoker at 15 indicator — — — — — — — — −0.947∗∗∗ 0.122
age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.094∗∗∗ 0.005 0.050∗∗ 0.022
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗ 0.007 −0.051∗∗∗ 0.012 0.435∗∗∗ 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.054 0.044 −0.116 0.268
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 −0.021 0.041 0.330 0.255
region: North West 0.054∗ 0.032 0.023 0.040 0.366 0.253
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.032 −0.005 0.038 −0.036 0.234
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 −0.009 0.048 0.305 0.323
region: South East 0.142∗∗∗ 0.028 0.083∗∗ 0.037 0.739∗∗∗ 0.206
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.015 0.040 0.150 0.237
region: Wales −0.012 0.040 −0.019 0.045 0.087 0.285
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 −0.020 0.045 0.600∗∗ 0.262
ethnicity: Black 0.114 0.105 0.115 0.117 −0.154 0.739
ethnicity: Asian −0.136∗ 0.071 −0.310∗∗∗ 0.107 2.050∗∗∗ 0.487
ethnicity: Other −0.048 0.103 −0.231∗ 0.120 2.184∗∗ 1.111
father’s occ class: 1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.028 0.022 0.043 1.136∗∗∗ 0.214
father’s occ class: 2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.074 0.070 2.328∗∗∗ 0.294
father’s occ class: 3 0.089∗∗ 0.043 −0.041 0.061 1.507∗∗∗ 0.328
father’s occ class: 4 0.065∗ 0.036 −0.052 0.052 1.370∗∗∗ 0.303
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.023 0.011 0.028 0.344∗∗ 0.170
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 −0.073 0.049 0.987∗∗∗ 0.309
father’s occ class: 7 0.103∗∗∗ 0.040 0.066 0.049 0.512 0.329
father’s occ class: 9 −0.021 0.029 0.028 0.035 −0.509∗∗∗ 0.197
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.030 0.010 0.187
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.035 0.061 0.134 0.412
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 −0.101 0.072 1.412∗∗∗ 0.448
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.053 0.057 0.024 0.391
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.015 0.049 0.472 0.308
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.031 0.058 −0.178 0.424
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.029 0.045 0.051 0.311
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.057 0.048 −0.102 0.312
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.004 0.038 0.034 0.045 −0.502∗ 0.284
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 −0.006 0.036 0.085 0.254
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 0.002 0.022 0.277∗∗ 0.136
mid 1990s −0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.049∗∗∗ 0.010 0.072 0.047
late 1990s −0.065∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.070∗∗∗ 0.016 0.102 0.082
post 2000 −0.033 0.021 −0.040∗ 0.023 0.123 0.127
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.077 0.242
F-test on exclusion of smoking at 15 from ﬁrst stage: 60.17; Partial R2 of instrument = 0.0229
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table 11: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 14
Status
OLS IV: smoker at 14 IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.754∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.569∗ 0.309 −1.693 1.670
years of schooling 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.150∗∗∗ 0.030 — — — —
smoker at 14 indicator — — — — — — — — −0.911∗∗∗ 0.148
age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.093∗∗∗ 0.005 0.053∗∗ 0.022
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗ 0.007 −0.061∗∗∗ 0.015 0.435∗∗∗ 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.056 0.048 −0.130 0.269
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 −0.028 0.045 0.320 0.254
region: North West 0.054∗ 0.032 0.015 0.044 0.360 0.252
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.032 −0.004 0.040 −0.047 0.233
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 −0.015 0.053 0.254 0.323
region: South East 0.142∗∗∗ 0.028 0.066 0.043 0.716∗∗∗ 0.205
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.013 0.044 0.098 0.237
region: Wales −0.012 0.040 −0.021 0.049 0.093 0.286
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 −0.034 0.050 0.586∗∗ 0.261
ethnicity: Black 0.114 0.105 0.115 0.125 −0.111 0.737
ethnicity: Asian −0.136∗ 0.071 −0.357∗∗∗ 0.120 2.073∗∗∗ 0.494
ethnicity: Other −0.048 0.103 −0.282∗∗ 0.140 2.149∗ 1.096
father’s occ class: 1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.004 0.051 1.132∗∗∗ 0.215
father’s occ class: 2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.128 0.087 2.328∗∗∗ 0.298
father’s occ class: 3 0.089∗∗ 0.043 −0.077 0.071 1.551∗∗∗ 0.328
father’s occ class: 4 0.065∗ 0.036 −0.084 0.062 1.383∗∗∗ 0.306
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.023 0.004 0.031 0.324∗ 0.171
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 −0.097∗ 0.056 0.984∗∗∗ 0.313
father’s occ class: 7 0.103∗∗∗ 0.040 0.056 0.055 0.431 0.334
father’s occ class: 9 −0.021 0.029 0.041 0.038 −0.519∗∗∗ 0.198
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.032 0.019 0.187
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.032 0.067 0.092 0.413
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 −0.133 0.081 1.381∗∗∗ 0.454
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.052 0.062 −0.011 0.393
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.004 0.054 0.408 0.310
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.037 0.063 −0.262 0.432
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.030 0.049 0.004 0.312
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.058 0.052 −0.114 0.314
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.004 0.038 0.044 0.048 −0.566∗∗ 0.286
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 −0.008 0.040 0.038 0.255
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 −0.006 0.024 0.268∗∗ 0.135
mid 1990s −0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.051∗∗∗ 0.010 0.061 0.047
late 1990s −0.065∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.071∗∗∗ 0.017 0.082 0.082
post 2000 −0.033 0.021 −0.041∗ 0.025 0.100 0.128
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.191 0.235
F-test on exclusion of smoking at 14 from ﬁrst stage: 38.10; Partial R2 of instrument = 0.0148
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table 12: Eﬀect of Early Smoking on Probability of Being a Home-owner, Probit Model
Home Owner
marginal fx z x-bar
log of hourly wage 0.204∗∗∗ 16.15 2.196
smoker at 16 indicator −0.044∗∗∗ −3.49 0.313
age −0.004 −1.03 39.430
age2 0.000∗∗∗ 2.93 1682.770
year-of-birth 0.022∗∗∗ 3.60 62.39 = 1958
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ −3.20 4025.480
region: North −0.013 −0.42 0.069
region: Yorkshire −0.067∗∗ −2.22 0.096
region: North West 0.009 0.35 0.105
region: East Midlands −0.043 −1.48 0.090
region: East Anglia −0.038 −1.09 0.043
region: South East −0.127∗∗∗ −4.96 0.287
region: South West −0.100∗∗∗ −3.11 0.098
region: Wales −0.075∗∗ −2.00 0.050
region: Scotland −0.107∗∗∗ −3.17 0.075
ethnicity: Black −0.094 −1.57 0.006
ethnicity: Asian 0.075∗∗ 2.25 0.017
ethnicity: Other 0.045 0.72 0.007
father’s occ class: 1 0.040∗ 1.93 0.134
father’s occ class: 2 −0.004 −0.16 0.064
father’s occ class: 3 0.021 0.65 0.038
father’s occ class: 4 0.026 0.76 0.047
father’s occ class: 5 0.015 0.82 0.222
father’s occ class: 6 −0.028 −0.94 0.044
father’s occ class: 7 −0.013 −0.35 0.032
father’s occ class: 9 −0.087∗∗∗ −3.08 0.080
father’s occ class: 10 −0.002 −0.12 0.177
mother’s occ class: 1 0.038 0.95 0.034
mother’s occ class: 2 −0.021 −0.47 0.029
mother’s occ class: 3 −0.046 −1.05 0.031
mother’s occ class: 4 −0.007 −0.21 0.094
mother’s occ class: 5 0.016 0.38 0.026
mother’s occ class: 6 0.017 0.52 0.073
mother’s occ class: 7 0.020 0.60 0.063
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.017 −0.49 0.078
mother’s occ class: 10 −0.034 −1.27 0.525
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.017 1.21 0.825
mid 1990s −0.004 −0.43 0.207
late 1990s −0.024∗ −1.66 0.224
post 2000 −0.057∗∗∗ −2.86 0.385
observed prob. 0.829
predicted prob. (at x-bar) 0.863
# observations 24034
# individuals 2615
Notes: Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with
both natural parents to 16, father/mother occupational class
‘plant/machine operative’.
Occupational Class dummies: (1) management, (2) professional,
(3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services,
(7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table 13: Eﬀect of Early Smoking on Probability of Having Had a Dental or Optician
Check-up in the Last Year, Probit Models
Dental Check Opticians Check
marginal fx z marginal fx z x-bar
log of hourly wage 0.132∗∗∗ 8.72 0.070∗∗∗ 5.92 2.196
smoker at 16 indicator −0.040∗∗∗ −2.67 −0.029∗∗∗ −2.59 0.313
age 0.001 0.11 −0.007 −1.59 39.415
age2 0.000 1.46 0.000∗∗∗ 3.55 1681.620
year-of-birth 0.039∗∗∗ 5.49 0.006 1.03 62.41 = 1958
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ −5.05 0.000 −0.88 4028.120
region: North 0.014 0.40 −0.004 −0.15 0.069
region: Yorkshire −0.006 −0.20 −0.007 −0.30 0.096
region: North West −0.034 −1.07 −0.015 −0.59 0.105
region: East Midlands −0.039 −1.21 −0.012 −0.49 0.090
region: East Anglia 0.110∗∗∗ 2.79 −0.017 −0.57 0.043
region: South East −0.048∗ −1.81 −0.021 −1.02 0.287
region: South West −0.003 −0.10 0.009 0.39 0.098
region: Wales −0.058 −1.47 −0.008 −0.28 0.050
region: Scotland −0.045 −1.25 0.005 0.20 0.075
ethnicity: Black 0.001 0.01 −0.014 −0.19 0.006
ethnicity: Asian −0.151∗∗∗ −2.71 0.051 1.13 0.017
ethnicity: Other −0.042 −0.52 0.128 1.62 0.007
father’s occ class: 1 0.037 1.40 0.072∗∗∗ 3.24 0.135
father’s occ class: 2 0.047 1.46 0.080∗∗∗ 2.87 0.064
father’s occ class: 3 0.027 0.63 0.088∗∗ 2.57 0.038
father’s occ class: 4 0.047 1.24 0.010 0.37 0.047
father’s occ class: 5 0.013 0.54 0.022 1.16 0.222
father’s occ class: 6 0.026 0.75 0.044 1.42 0.044
father’s occ class: 7 0.058 1.30 0.040 1.07 0.032
father’s occ class: 9 −0.011 −0.35 0.016 0.66 0.080
father’s occ class: 10 0.026 1.02 0.022 1.01 0.178
mother’s occ class: 1 0.049 1.03 −0.016 −0.42 0.034
mother’s occ class: 2 0.059 1.15 −0.048 −1.10 0.029
mother’s occ class: 3 0.031 0.59 0.018 0.43 0.031
mother’s occ class: 4 0.061 1.63 −0.016 −0.49 0.094
mother’s occ class: 5 −0.016 −0.31 −0.018 −0.40 0.026
mother’s occ class: 6 0.008 0.22 −0.013 −0.41 0.072
mother’s occ class: 7 0.105 2.68 0.049 1.38 0.063
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.019 −0.49 −0.026 −0.85 0.078
mother’s occ class: 10 0.024 0.74 −0.014 −0.53 0.526
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.035∗∗∗ 1.94 0.019 1.27 0.825
mid 1990s 0.003 0.26 0.010 0.85 0.207
late 1990s 0.010 0.56 0.028∗ 1.69 0.224
post 2000 0.018 0.67 0.023 0.94 0.386
observed prob. 0.631 0.307
predicted prob. (at x-bar) 0.636 0.302
# observations 24086 24086
# individuals 2615 2615
Notes: Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
67Table 14: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using RoSLA
OLS IV: RoSLA IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.754∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.655∗∗ 0.280 −1.459 1.681
years of schooling 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.102∗∗ 0.051 — — — —
min. school LA=16 — — — — — — — — 0.564∗∗∗ 0.206
age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.095∗∗∗ 0.005 0.056∗∗ 0.022
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗ 0.007 −0.040∗ 0.023 0.427∗∗∗ 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.051 0.041 −0.080 0.272
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 −0.014 0.040 0.320 0.256
region: North West 0.054∗ 0.032 0.033 0.041 0.386 0.255
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.032 −0.007 0.035 −0.035 0.234
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 −0.001 0.047 0.324 0.327
region: South East 0.142∗∗∗ 0.028 0.101∗∗ 0.051 0.741 0.208
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.017 0.038 0.114∗∗∗ 0.240
region: Wales −0.012 0.040 −0.017 0.043 0.093 0.290
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 −0.005 0.050 0.658∗∗ 0.266
ethnicity: Black 0.114 0.105 0.114 0.110 0.037 0.746
ethnicity: Asian −0.136∗ 0.071 −0.255∗ 0.139 2.146∗∗∗ 0.515
ethnicity: Other −0.048 0.103 −0.174 0.152 2.214∗∗ 1.074
father’s occ class: 1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.028 0.051 0.069 1.162∗∗∗ 0.216
father’s occ class: 2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.013 0.128 2.404∗∗∗ 0.298
father’s occ class: 3 0.089∗∗ 0.043 0.000 0.093 1.585∗∗∗ 0.333
father’s occ class: 4 0.065∗ 0.036 −0.015 0.083 1.440∗∗∗ 0.308
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.023 0.020 0.029 0.322∗ 0.172
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 −0.046 0.064 1.046∗∗∗ 0.313
father’s occ class: 7 0.103∗∗∗ 0.040 0.078 0.049 0.484 0.339
father’s occ class: 9 −0.021 0.029 0.012 0.044 −0.592∗∗∗ 0.196
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.043 0.186
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.039 0.056 0.107 0.426
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 −0.065 0.094 1.378∗∗∗ 0.454
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.054 0.053 0.007 0.395
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.027 0.050 0.453 0.317
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.025 0.054 −0.240 0.430
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.027 0.042 −0.070 0.322
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.057 0.044 −0.053 0.324
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.004 0.038 0.022 0.047 −0.491∗ 0.293
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 −0.003 0.034 0.103 0.264
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 0.010 0.026 0.330∗∗ 0.137
mid 1990s −0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.048∗∗∗ 0.010 0.063 0.047
late 1990s −0.065∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.068∗∗∗ 0.015 0.075 0.083
post 2000 −0.033 0.021 −0.038∗ 0.023 0.094 0.129
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.177 0.227
F-test on exclusion of min. school LA=16 from ﬁrst stage: 7.49; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0044
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table 15: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using RoSLA, Basic
Speciﬁcation
OLS IV: RoSLA IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.849∗∗∗ 0.247 −0.668∗∗ 0.303 −3.375∗ 1.727
years of schooling 0.052∗∗∗ 0.003 0.100∗∗ 0.042 — — — —
min. school LA=16 — — — — — — — — 0.691∗∗∗ 0.219
age 0.098∗∗∗ 0.004 0.095∗∗∗ 0.005 0.068∗∗∗ 0.023
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.014∗∗ 0.007 −0.038∗ 0.022 0.501∗∗∗ 0.042
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.041 0.038 0.046 0.041 −0.089 0.286
region: Yorkshire −0.003 0.033 −0.014 0.038 0.246 0.268
region: North West 0.050 0.033 0.030 0.041 0.418 0.273
region: East Midlands −0.016 0.032 −0.009 0.035 −0.129 0.258
region: East Anglia 0.010 0.040 −0.001 0.045 0.277 0.343
region: South East 0.143∗∗∗ 0.028 0.099∗ 0.052 0.936∗∗∗ 0.223
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.014 0.038 0.202 0.256
region: Wales −0.018 0.040 −0.019 0.042 0.022 0.314
region: Scotland 0.020 0.036 −0.010 0.048 0.710∗∗ 0.288
ethnicity: Black 0.117 0.093 0.108 0.105 0.251 0.700
ethnicity: Asian −0.150∗∗ 0.070 −0.248∗∗ 0.120 2.075∗∗∗ 0.560
ethnicity: Other −0.042 0.095 −0.167 0.149 2.566∗∗∗ 0.939
mid 1990s −0.047∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.048∗∗∗ 0.010 0.036 0.050
late 1990s −0.068∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.068∗∗∗ 0.015 0.013 0.089
post 2000 −0.038∗ 0.021 −0.037∗ 0.022 −0.004 0.137
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.251 0.176 0.113
F-test on exclusion of instrument from ﬁrst stage: 9.98; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0058
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
69Table 16: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status and RoSLA
OLS IV: both IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.754∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.613∗∗ 0.283 −0.157 1.663
years of schooling 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.125∗∗∗ 0.019 — — — —
smoker at 16 indicator — — — — — — — — −0.874∗∗∗ 0.107
min. school LA=16 — — — — — — — — 0.556∗∗∗ 0.202
age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.094∗∗∗ 0.005 0.054∗∗ 0.022
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗ 0.007 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.011 0.399∗∗∗ 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.053 0.044 −0.097 0.272
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 −0.021 0.040 0.347 0.253
region: North West 0.054∗ 0.032 0.024 0.039 0.409 0.253
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.032 −0.006 0.037 −0.014 0.235
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 −0.008 0.048 0.398 0.325
region: South East 0.142∗∗∗ 0.028 0.084∗∗ 0.036 0.767∗∗∗ 0.207
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.015 0.040 0.192 0.236
region: Wales −0.012 0.040 −0.019 0.045 0.082 0.286
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 −0.019 0.043 0.705∗∗∗ 0.263
ethnicity: Black 0.114 0.105 0.115 0.116 −0.114 0.788
ethnicity: Asian −0.136∗ 0.071 −0.305∗∗∗ 0.103 1.975∗∗∗ 0.493
ethnicity: Other −0.048 0.103 −0.226∗ 0.116 2.021∗ 1.080
father’s occ class: 1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.028 0.024 0.040 1.118∗∗∗ 0.213
father’s occ class: 2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.068 0.062 2.271∗∗∗ 0.290
father’s occ class: 3 0.089∗∗ 0.043 −0.038 0.056 1.485∗∗∗ 0.319
father’s occ class: 4 0.065∗ 0.036 −0.048 0.050 1.324∗∗∗ 0.303
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.023 0.012 0.027 0.322∗ 0.170
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 −0.070 0.046 0.968∗∗∗ 0.303
father’s occ class: 7 0.103∗∗∗ 0.040 0.067 0.048 0.501 0.330
father’s occ class: 9 −0.021 0.029 0.026 0.034 −0.542∗∗∗ 0.194
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.030 0.000 0.185
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.036 0.060 0.079 0.414
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 −0.098 0.069 1.379∗∗∗ 0.442
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.053 0.057 0.018 0.388
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.016 0.048 0.451 0.310
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.030 0.057 −0.104 0.414
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.028 0.045 0.030 0.313
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.057 0.047 −0.111 0.316
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.004 0.038 0.033 0.044 −0.488∗ 0.285
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 −0.005 0.036 0.099 0.256
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 0.002 0.022 0.251∗ 0.136
mid 1990s −0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.049∗∗∗ 0.010 0.073 0.046
late 1990s −0.065∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.070∗∗∗ 0.016 0.092 0.081
post 2000 −0.033 0.021 −0.039∗ 0.023 0.120 0.126
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.088 0.250
F-test on exclusion of instruments from ﬁrst stage: 36.83; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0332
Hansen’s J-test of overidentiﬁcation = 0.202, p-value = 0.6529
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
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Figure 5: Proportion Left Full-Time Education at age 15 and at age 16
73APPENDIXA Estimating the HCEF using only those with 11 or
more years education
Table A-1: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status
OLS IV: smoker at 16 IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.318∗∗∗ 0.331 −0.845∗∗ 0.419 6.778 2.227
years of schooling 0.038∗∗∗ 0.003 0.132∗∗∗ 0.026 — — — —
smoker at 16 indicator — — — — — — — — −0.833∗∗∗ 0.125
age 0.106∗∗∗ 0.005 0.104∗∗∗ 0.006 0.021∗∗∗ 0.026
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.026∗∗ 0.009 −0.052∗∗∗ 0.013 0.247∗∗∗ 0.059
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.061∗∗ 0.042 0.070 0.052 −0.081 0.298
region: Yorkshire 0.017 0.038 −0.020 0.049 0.440 0.285
region: North West 0.057 0.038 0.002 0.048 0.611 0.283
region: East Midlands −0.005 0.037 −0.011 0.045 0.107 0.268
region: East Anglia 0.008 0.044 −0.015 0.055 0.308 0.361
region: South East 0.149∗∗∗ 0.032 0.082∗∗ 0.043 0.762∗∗∗ 0.223
region: South West 0.023 0.038 0.014 0.047 0.175 0.261
region: Wales 0.008 0.046 −0.017 0.053 0.241 0.311
region: Scotland 0.039 0.040 −0.032 0.052 0.799∗∗ 0.292
ethnicity: Black 0.132 0.113 0.115 0.129 0.055 0.716
ethnicity: Asian −0.165∗ 0.070 −0.340∗∗∗ 0.107 1.733∗∗∗ 0.484
ethnicity: Other −0.041 0.112 −0.279∗∗ 0.134 2.392∗ 1.103
father’s occ class: 1 0.125∗∗∗ 0.031 0.036 0.045 0.909∗∗∗ 0.231
father’s occ class: 2 0.144∗∗∗ 0.039 −0.049 0.071 1.935∗∗∗ 0.297
father’s occ class: 3 0.082∗∗ 0.044 −0.036 0.060 1.162∗∗∗ 0.331
father’s occ class: 4 0.085∗ 0.040 −0.020 0.057 1.006∗∗∗ 0.324
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.026 0.016 0.033 0.227∗∗∗ 0.200
father’s occ class: 6 0.020 0.038 −0.072 0.054 0.873∗∗∗ 0.332
father’s occ class: 7 0.107∗∗∗ 0.043 0.098 0.055 0.131 0.358
father’s occ class: 9 0.002 0.037 0.058 0.046 −0.585∗∗∗ 0.252
father’s occ class: 10 0.035 0.031 0.034 0.037 −0.047 0.223
mother’s occ class: 1 0.019 0.056 0.007 0.073 0.098 0.454
mother’s occ class: 2 −0.017 0.057 −0.111 0.073 1.033∗∗∗ 0.451
mother’s occ class: 3 0.025 0.052 0.064 0.064 −0.367 0.427
mother’s occ class: 4 0.024 0.043 0.005 0.055 0.238 0.345
mother’s occ class: 5 −0.018 0.057 0.004 0.072 −0.097 0.489
mother’s occ class: 6 0.003 0.044 0.036 0.055 −0.227 0.357
mother’s occ class: 7 0.026 0.046 0.067 0.058 −0.472 0.354
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.065 0.044 −0.011 0.055 −0.572 0.346
mother’s occ class: 10 −0.015 0.036 −0.004 0.046 −0.105 0.305
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.016 0.022 −0.009 0.026 0.180∗ 0.147
mid 1990s −0.049∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.057∗∗∗ 0.011 0.086 0.051
late 1990s −0.068∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.077∗∗∗ 0.018 0.111 0.088
post 2000 −0.033 0.023 −0.045∗ 0.027 0.144 0.136
# observations 16985 16985 16985
# individuals 1739 1739 1739
R2 0.278 0.040 0.218
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
75B Estimating the HCEF using only one observation
per person in the ﬁrst stage
Table B-1: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status
OLS IV: smoker at 16 IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.754∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.541 0.351 −0.137 6.170
years of schooling 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.133∗∗∗ 0.021 — — — —
smoker at 16 indicator — — — — — — — — −0.876∗∗∗ 0.097
age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.101∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.004 0.083
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.001
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.058∗∗∗ 0.012 0.411∗∗∗ 0.109
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.061 0.044 −0.187 0.238
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 0.006 0.039 0.136 0.223
region: North West 0.054 0.032 0.048 0.037 0.207 0.226
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.032 −0.001 0.037 −0.104 0.224
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 0.010 0.049 0.180 0.302
region: South East 0.142∗∗∗ 0.028 0.102∗∗∗ 0.035 0.610∗∗∗ 0.186
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.030 0.037 0.037 0.217
region: Wales −0.012 0.040 −0.009 0.044 −0.042 0.270
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 0.014 0.040 0.362 0.229
ethnicity: Black 0.114 0.105 0.096 0.166 −0.034 0.881
ethnicity: Asian −0.136 0.071 −0.251∗∗∗ 0.092 1.385∗∗∗ 0.458
ethnicity: Other −0.048 0.103 −0.180 0.140 1.615∗ 0.841
father’s occ class: 1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.028 0.010 0.039 1.163∗∗∗ 0.146
father’s occ class: 2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.094 0.069 2.314∗∗∗ 0.209
father’s occ class: 3 0.089∗∗ 0.043 −0.033 0.056 1.369∗∗∗ 0.236
father’s occ class: 4 0.065∗ 0.036 −0.077 0.056 1.439∗∗∗ 0.219
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.023 0.007 0.027 0.359∗∗∗ 0.116
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 −0.073 0.046 0.933∗∗∗ 0.189
father’s occ class: 7 0.103∗∗∗ 0.04 0.057 0.048 0.490∗∗ 0.219
father’s occ class: 9 −0.021 0.029 0.025 0.037 −0.494∗∗∗ 0.132
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.007 0.030 0.152 0.126
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.025 0.064 0.159 0.296
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 −0.108 0.071 1.379∗∗∗ 0.313
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.032 0.063 0.179 0.312
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.04 0.008 0.049 0.491∗∗∗ 0.225
mother’s occ class: 5 0.01 0.049 0.019 0.062 −0.044 0.263
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.04 0.030 0.049 0.031 0.228
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.054 0.049 −0.082 0.227
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.004 0.038 0.030 0.049 −0.439∗∗∗ 0.201
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 −0.010 0.039 0.138 0.176
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 −0.006 0.023 0.290 0.097
mid 1990s −0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.039 0.015 −0.130 0.211
late 1990s −0.065∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.056 0.023 −0.144 0.347
post 2000 −0.033 0.021 −0.023 0.034 −0.055 0.533
# observations 21256 13498 1432
# individuals 2266 1398 1432
R2 0.265 0.220 0.250
F-test on exclusion of instrument from ﬁrst stage: 51.50; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0302
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
IV second stage standard errors obtained by bootstrapping.Table B-2: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using RoSLA
OLS IV: RoSLA IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.754∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.533 0.377 −0.564 5.011
years of schooling 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.143∗∗ 0.058 — — — —
min. school LA=16 — — — — — — — — 0.487∗∗∗ 0.153
age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.101∗∗∗ 0.006 0.020 0.070
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.001
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.062∗∗ 0.028 0.408∗∗∗ 0.091
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.058 0.048 −0.132 0.192
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 0.000 0.045 0.142 0.178
region: North West 0.054 0.032 0.047 0.041 0.176 0.175
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.032 0.004 0.039 −0.139 0.174
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 0.007 0.054 0.121 0.243
region: South East 0.142∗∗∗ 0.028 0.093∗ 0.049 0.609∗∗∗ 0.141
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.026 0.039 −0.005 0.171
region: Wales −0.012 0.040 −0.006 0.047 −0.023 0.211
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 0.007 0.048 0.388∗∗ 0.185
ethnicity: Black 0.114 0.105 0.102 0.181 0.123 0.788
ethnicity: Asian −0.136 0.071 −0.270∗∗ 0.134 1.571∗∗∗ 0.377
ethnicity: Other −0.048 0.103 −0.202 0.173 1.756∗∗ 0.695
father’s occ class: 1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.004 0.078 1.217∗∗∗ 0.149
father’s occ class: 2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.120 0.155 2.443∗∗∗ 0.213
father’s occ class: 3 0.089∗∗ 0.043 −0.052 0.101 1.474∗∗∗ 0.244
father’s occ class: 4 0.065∗ 0.036 −0.093 0.102 1.566∗∗∗ 0.222
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.023 0.001 0.035 0.359∗∗∗ 0.118
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 −0.084 0.074 0.994∗∗∗ 0.196
father’s occ class: 7 0.103∗∗∗ 0.040 0.050 0.057 0.535∗∗ 0.223
father’s occ class: 9 −0.021 0.029 0.029 0.048 −0.522∗∗∗ 0.133
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.003 0.034 0.210 0.128
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.025 0.073 0.132 0.303
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 −0.130 0.108 1.373∗∗∗ 0.321
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.030 0.068 0.150 0.317
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 −0.001 0.058 0.485∗∗ 0.234
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.014 0.069 −0.112 0.274
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.027 0.052 −0.056 0.234
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.059 0.054 −0.080 0.233
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.004 0.038 0.037 0.061 −0.471∗∗ 0.208
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 −0.013 0.042 0.135 0.184
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 −0.011 0.033 0.376∗∗∗ 0.097
mid 1990s −0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.039∗∗ 0.015 −0.161 0.209
late 1990s −0.065∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.056∗∗ 0.023 −0.137 0.349
post 2000 −0.033 0.021 −0.024 0.034 −0.030 0.539
# observations 21256 13498 1398
# individuals 2266 1398 1398
R2 0.265 0.160 0.229
F-test on exclusion of instrument from ﬁrst stage: 4.06; Partial R2 of the instrument = 0.0029
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.
IV second stage standard errors obtained by bootstrapping.C HCEF Estimates, OLS and IV using Fuller(1) LIML
estimator
Table C-1: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status
OLS IV: smoker at 16 IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.754∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.607∗∗ 0.287 −0.471 1.664
years of schooling 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.129∗∗∗ 0.020 — — — —
smoker at 16 indicator — — — — — — — — −0.876∗∗∗ 0.108
age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.094∗∗∗ 0.005 0.056∗∗∗ 0.022
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗ 0.007 −0.052∗∗∗ 0.011 0.398∗∗∗ 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.054 0.044 −0.103 0.272
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 −0.022 0.041 0.331 0.253
region: North West 0.054∗ 0.032 0.023 0.040 0.402 0.253
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.032 −0.005 0.038 −0.034 0.235
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 −0.009 0.048 0.366 0.324
region: South East 0.142∗∗∗ 0.028 0.082∗∗ 0.037 0.757∗∗∗ 0.206
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.015 0.041 0.175 0.237
region: Wales −0.012 0.040 −0.019 0.045 0.081 0.285
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 −0.021 0.044 0.643∗∗ 0.262
ethnicity: Black 0.114 0.105 0.115 0.117 −0.164 0.779
ethnicity: Asian −0.136∗ 0.071 −0.312∗∗∗ 0.105 1.965∗∗∗ 0.485
ethnicity: Other −0.048 0.103 −0.234∗∗ 0.119 2.067∗ 1.111
father’s occ class: 1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.028 0.020 0.041 1.122∗∗∗ 0.214
father’s occ class: 2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.076 0.065 2.268∗∗∗ 0.291
father’s occ class: 3 0.089∗∗ 0.043 −0.043 0.058 1.499∗∗∗ 0.321
father’s occ class: 4 0.065∗ 0.036 −0.053 0.051 1.320∗∗∗ 0.305
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.023 0.011 0.028 0.335∗∗ 0.170
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 −0.074 0.048 0.991∗∗∗ 0.305
father’s occ class: 7 0.103∗∗∗ 0.040 0.066 0.049 0.467 0.330
father’s occ class: 9 −0.021 0.029 0.028 0.035 −0.551∗∗∗ 0.197
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.030 −0.012 0.186
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.035 0.061 0.112 0.411
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 −0.103 0.070 1.433∗∗∗ 0.439
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.053 0.057 0.046 0.387
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.015 0.048 0.485 0.307
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.031 0.058 −0.117 0.417
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.029 0.045 0.054 0.311
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.057 0.048 −0.083 0.312
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.004 0.038 0.034 0.044 −0.461 0.284
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 −0.006 0.036 0.115 0.253
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 0.001 0.022 0.247∗ 0.136
mid 1990s −0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.010 0.067 0.046
late 1990s −0.065∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.070∗∗∗ 0.016 0.080 0.081
post 2000 −0.033 0.021 −0.040∗ 0.023 0.108 0.126
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.073 0.246
F-test on exclusion of smoking at 16 from ﬁrst stage: 66.17; Partial R2 of instrument = 0.0289
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table C-2: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using RoSLA
OLS IV: RoSLA IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.754∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.656∗∗ 0.279 −1.459 1.681
years of schooling 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.101∗∗ 0.051 — — — —
min. school LA=16 — — — — — — — — 0.564∗∗∗ 0.206
age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.095∗∗∗ 0.005 0.056∗∗ 0.022
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗ 0.007 −0.040∗ 0.023 0.427∗∗∗ 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.051 0.041 −0.080 0.272
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 −0.013 0.040 0.320 0.256
region: North West 0.054∗ 0.032 0.033 0.041 0.386 0.255
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.032 −0.007 0.035 −0.035 0.234
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 −0.001 0.046 0.324 0.327
region: South East 0.142∗∗∗ 0.028 0.102∗∗ 0.051 0.741∗∗∗ 0.208
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.017 0.038 0.114 0.240
region: Wales −0.012 0.040 −0.017 0.042 0.093 0.290
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 −0.005 0.050 0.658∗∗ 0.266
ethnicity: Black 0.114 0.105 0.114 0.110 0.037 0.746
ethnicity: Asian −0.136∗ 0.071 −0.254∗ 0.138 2.146∗∗∗ 0.515
ethnicity: Other −0.048 0.103 −0.172 0.151 2.214∗∗ 1.074
father’s occ class: 1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.028 0.052 0.068 1.162∗∗∗ 0.216
father’s occ class: 2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.011 0.127 2.404∗∗∗ 0.298
father’s occ class: 3 0.089∗∗ 0.043 0.001 0.092 1.585∗∗∗ 0.333
father’s occ class: 4 0.065∗ 0.036 −0.014 0.082 1.440∗∗∗ 0.308
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.023 0.020 0.029 0.322∗ 0.172
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 −0.045 0.063 1.046∗∗∗ 0.313
father’s occ class: 7 0.103∗∗∗ 0.040 0.078 0.049 0.484 0.339
father’s occ class: 9 −0.021 0.029 0.012 0.044 −0.592∗∗∗ 0.196
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.043 0.186
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.039 0.056 0.107 0.426
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 −0.064 0.093 1.378∗∗∗ 0.454
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.054 0.052 0.007 0.395
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.028 0.050 0.453 0.317
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.024 0.054 −0.240 0.430
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.027 0.042 −0.070 0.322
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.057 0.044 −0.053 0.324
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.004 0.038 0.022 0.047 −0.491∗ 0.293
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 −0.003 0.034 0.103 0.264
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 0.010 0.026 0.330∗∗ 0.137
mid 1990s −0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.048∗∗∗ 0.010 0.063 0.047
late 1990s −0.065∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.068∗∗∗ 0.015 0.075 0.083
post 2000 −0.033 0.021 −0.038∗ 0.022 0.094 0.129
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.178 0.227
F-test on exclusion of min. sch. LA=16 from ﬁrst stage: 7.49; Partial R2 of instrument = 0.0044
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table C-3: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using Smoker at 16
Status and RoSLA
OLS IV: both IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.754∗∗∗ 0.250 −0.613∗∗ 0.283 −0.157 1.663
years of schooling 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.125∗∗∗ 0.019 — — — —
smoker at age 16 — — — — — — — — −0.874∗∗∗ 0.107
min. school LA=16 — — — — — — — — 0.556∗∗∗ 0.202
age 0.099∗∗∗ 0.004 0.094∗∗∗ 0.005 0.054∗∗ 0.022
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.016∗∗ 0.007 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.011 0.399∗∗∗ 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.047 0.038 0.053 0.044 −0.097 0.272
region: Yorkshire 0.003 0.033 −0.021 0.040 0.347 0.253
region: North West 0.054∗ 0.032 0.024 0.039 0.409 0.253
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.032 −0.006 0.037 −0.014 0.235
region: East Anglia 0.015 0.039 −0.008 0.048 0.398 0.325
region: South East 0.142∗∗∗ 0.028 0.084∗∗ 0.036 0.767∗∗∗ 0.207
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.015 0.040 0.192 0.236
region: Wales −0.012 0.040 −0.019 0.045 0.082 0.286
region: Scotland 0.028 0.036 −0.019 0.043 0.705∗∗∗ 0.263
ethnicity: Black 0.114 0.105 0.115 0.116 −0.114 0.788
ethnicity: Asian −0.136∗ 0.071 −0.305∗∗∗ 0.103 1.975∗∗∗ 0.493
ethnicity: Other −0.048 0.103 −0.226∗ 0.116 2.021∗ 1.080
father’s occ class: 1 0.116∗∗∗ 0.028 0.024 0.040 1.118∗∗∗ 0.213
father’s occ class: 2 0.121∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.069 0.062 2.271∗∗∗ 0.290
father’s occ class: 3 0.089∗∗ 0.043 −0.038 0.056 1.485∗∗∗ 0.319
father’s occ class: 4 0.065∗ 0.036 −0.049 0.050 1.324∗∗∗ 0.303
father’s occ class: 5 0.038∗ 0.023 0.012 0.027 0.322∗ 0.170
father’s occ class: 6 0.014 0.035 −0.071 0.046 0.968∗∗∗ 0.303
father’s occ class: 7 0.103∗∗∗ 0.040 0.067 0.048 0.501 0.330
father’s occ class: 9 −0.021 0.029 0.026 0.034 −0.542∗∗∗ 0.194
father’s occ class: 10 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.030 0.000 0.185
mother’s occ class: 1 0.047 0.049 0.036 0.060 0.079 0.414
mother’s occ class: 2 0.015 0.054 −0.098 0.069 1.379∗∗∗ 0.442
mother’s occ class: 3 0.056 0.048 0.053 0.057 0.018 0.388
mother’s occ class: 4 0.055 0.040 0.016 0.048 0.451 0.310
mother’s occ class: 5 0.010 0.049 0.030 0.057 −0.104 0.414
mother’s occ class: 6 0.025 0.040 0.028 0.045 0.030 0.313
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.041 0.057 0.047 −0.111 0.316
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.004 0.038 0.033 0.044 −0.488∗ 0.285
mother’s occ class: 10 0.004 0.032 −0.005 0.036 0.099 0.256
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.028 0.019 0.002 0.022 0.251∗ 0.136
mid 1990s −0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.049∗∗∗ 0.010 0.073 0.046
late 1990s −0.065∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.070∗∗∗ 0.016 0.092 0.081
post 2000 −0.033 0.021 −0.039∗ 0.023 0.120 0.126
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.265 0.087 0.250
F-test on exclusion of both instruments from ﬁrst stage: 36.83; Partial R2 of instrument = 0.0332
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table C-4: Human Capital Earnings Function Estimations, OLS and IV using RoSLA, basic
speciﬁcation
OLS IV: RoSLA IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.849∗∗∗ 0.247 −0.669∗∗ 0.302 −3.375∗ 1.727
years of schooling 0.052∗∗∗ 0.003 0.100∗∗ 0.041 — — — —
min. school LA=16 — — — — — — — — 0.691∗∗∗ 0.219
age 0.098∗∗∗ 0.004 0.095∗∗∗ 0.005 0.068∗∗∗ 0.023
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.014∗∗ 0.007 −0.037∗ 0.022 0.501∗∗∗ 0.042
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.041 0.038 0.046 0.041 −0.089 0.286
region: Yorkshire −0.003 0.033 −0.013 0.038 0.246 0.268
region: North West 0.050 0.033 0.030 0.040 0.418 0.273
region: East Midlands −0.016 0.032 −0.009 0.035 −0.129 0.258
region: East Anglia 0.010 0.040 −0.001 0.045 0.277 0.343
region: South East 0.143∗∗∗ 0.028 0.100∗ 0.052 0.936∗∗∗ 0.223
region: South West 0.023 0.034 0.014 0.038 0.202 0.256
region: Wales −0.018 0.040 −0.019 0.042 0.022 0.314
region: Scotland 0.020 0.036 −0.010 0.047 0.710∗∗ 0.288
ethnicity: Black 0.117 0.093 0.108 0.105 0.251 0.700
ethnicity: Asian −0.150∗∗ 0.070 −0.247∗∗ 0.119 2.075∗∗∗ 0.560
ethnicity: Other −0.042 0.095 −0.166 0.148 2.566∗∗∗ 0.939
mid 1990s −0.047∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.048∗∗∗ 0.010 0.036 0.050
late 1990s −0.068∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.068∗∗∗ 0.015 0.013 0.089
post 2000 −0.038∗ 0.021 −0.037∗ 0.022 −0.004 0.137
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.251 0.177 0.113
F-test on exclusion of min. sch. LA=16 from ﬁrst stage: 9.98; Partial R2 of instrument = 0.0058
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
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Table D-1: Reduced Form for Log Hourly Wage: Smoker at 16 instrument, RoSLA instru-
ment and Both instruments
Smoker at 16 Min. School LA=16 Both
Robust Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.668∗∗ 0.261 −0.803∗∗∗ 0.263 −0.636∗∗ 0.261
smoker at 16 indicator −0.113∗∗∗ 0.016 — — — — −0.113∗∗∗ 0.016
min. school LA=16 — — — — 0.058∗∗ 0.028 0.057∗∗ 0.027
age 0.101∗∗∗ 0.004 0.101∗∗∗ 0.004 0.101∗∗∗ 0.004
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.000 0.007 0.003 0.007 −0.000 0.007
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000
region: North 0.040 0.040 0.043 0.040 0.041 0.039
region: Yorkshire 0.021 0.035 0.019 0.035 0.023 0.035
region: North West 0.075∗∗ 0.034 0.072∗∗ 0.034 0.075∗∗ 0.034
region: East Midlands −0.010 0.033 −0.010 0.034 −0.008 0.033
region: East Anglia 0.038 0.040 0.032 0.041 0.041 0.040
region: South East 0.179∗∗∗ 0.029 0.177∗∗∗ 0.029 0.180∗∗∗ 0.029
region: South West 0.037 0.034 0.029 0.034 0.039 0.034
region: Wales −0.009 0.042 −0.007 0.043 −0.009 0.042
region: Scotland 0.062∗ 0.037 0.062∗ 0.037 0.068∗ 0.037
ethnicity: Black 0.094 0.115 0.118 0.113 0.099 0.115
ethnicity: Asian −0.059 0.066 −0.036 0.066 −0.058 0.066
ethnicity: Other 0.032 0.132 0.052 0.129 0.028 0.130
father’s occ class: 1 0.165∗∗∗ 0.029 0.170∗∗∗ 0.029 0.164∗∗∗ 0.029
father’s occ class: 2 0.215∗∗∗ 0.040 0.233∗∗∗ 0.041 0.216∗∗∗ 0.041
father’s occ class: 3 0.150∗∗∗ 0.046 0.162∗∗∗ 0.047 0.149∗∗∗ 0.047
father’s occ class: 4 0.117∗∗∗ 0.040 0.132∗∗∗ 0.041 0.117∗∗∗ 0.040
father’s occ class: 5 0.054∗∗ 0.024 0.053∗∗ 0.024 0.053∗∗ 0.024
father’s occ class: 6 0.054 0.039 0.061 0.038 0.051 0.038
father’s occ class: 7 0.126∗∗∗ 0.042 0.127∗∗∗ 0.043 0.129∗∗∗ 0.042
father’s occ class: 9 −0.043 0.031 −0.048 0.031 −0.042 0.031
father’s occ class: 10 0.025 0.028 0.032 0.028 0.026 0.028
mother’s occ class: 1 0.050 0.052 0.050 0.053 0.046 0.052
mother’s occ class: 2 0.082 0.060 0.076 0.060 0.076 0.061
mother’s occ class: 3 0.059 0.051 0.055 0.052 0.056 0.051
mother’s occ class: 4 0.077∗ 0.042 0.074∗ 0.043 0.073∗ 0.042
mother’s occ class: 5 0.016 0.052 −0.000 0.054 0.018 0.052
mother’s occ class: 6 0.035 0.043 0.020 0.044 0.033 0.043
mother’s occ class: 7 0.047 0.043 0.051 0.044 0.044 0.043
mother’s occ class: 9 −0.025 0.040 −0.028 0.042 −0.028 0.040
mother’s occ class: 10 0.009 0.034 0.008 0.036 0.007 0.034
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.033 0.021 0.044∗∗ 0.021 0.033 0.021
mid 1990s −0.041∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.042∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.040∗∗∗ 0.009
late 1990s −0.060∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.061∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.058∗∗∗ 0.015
post 2000 −0.026 0.021 −0.028 0.022 −0.025 0.021
# observations 21256 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266 2266
R2 0.217 0.205 0.218
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.Table D-2: Regression of Residuals from Structural Equation when using the RoSLA IV on
the Smoker at 16 indicator
Robust
Dep. Var: ˆ ǫi Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant 0.007 0.009




Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
Construction of the dependent variable ˆ ǫi:
Log hourly wage estimated by IV regression, ﬁrst stage equation (10) estimated:
ˆ Si = Xi˜ γ + Zi˜ π + ui where Zi is the min. school LA=16 indicator.
Second stage equation (11) estimated:
log(wi) = Xiϕ + ˆ Siβi + ǫi. The residuals are recovered and these ˆ ǫi are the dependent variable.
83Table D-3: HCEF using RoSLA IV, including Smoker at 16 Status as an Explanatory Vari-
able
IV: RoSLA IV: ﬁrst stage
Robust Robust
Dep. Var: log hourly wage Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
constant −0.620∗∗ 0.267 −0.157 1.663
years of schooling 0.102∗ 0.052 — — — —
min. school LA=16 — — — — 0.556∗∗∗ 0.202
smoker at 16 indicator −0.024 0.049 −0.874∗∗∗ 0.107
age 0.095∗∗∗ 0.005 0.054∗∗ 0.022
age2 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
year-of-birth −0.041∗ 0.022 0.399∗∗∗ 0.041
year-of-birth2 0.000∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
region: North 0.051 0.041 −0.097 0.272
region: Yorkshire −0.013 0.041 0.347 0.253
region: North West 0.034 0.042 0.409 0.253
region: East Midlands −0.006 0.035 −0.014 0.235
region: East Anglia 0.001 0.048 0.398 0.325
region: South East 0.102∗ 0.053 0.767∗∗∗ 0.207
region: South West 0.019 0.038 0.192 0.236
region: Wales −0.017 0.042 0.082 0.286
region: Scotland −0.004 0.052 0.705∗∗∗ 0.263
ethnicity: Black 0.110 0.109 −0.114 0.788
ethnicity: Asian −0.259∗ 0.133 1.975∗∗∗ 0.493
ethnicity: Other −0.178 0.146 2.021∗ 1.080
father’s occ class: 1 0.051 0.068 1.118∗∗∗ 0.213
father’s occ class: 2 −0.015 0.123 2.271∗∗∗ 0.290
father’s occ class: 3 −0.002 0.089 1.485∗∗∗ 0.319
father’s occ class: 4 −0.018 0.078 1.324∗∗∗ 0.303
father’s occ class: 5 0.020 0.029 0.322∗ 0.170
father’s occ class: 6 −0.047 0.061 0.968∗∗∗ 0.303
father’s occ class: 7 0.078 0.050 0.501 0.330
father’s occ class: 9 0.013 0.042 −0.542∗∗∗ 0.194
father’s occ class: 10 0.026 0.028 0.000 0.185
mother’s occ class: 1 0.038 0.056 0.079 0.414
mother’s occ class: 2 −0.064 0.095 1.379∗∗∗ 0.442
mother’s occ class: 3 0.054 0.052 0.018 0.388
mother’s occ class: 4 0.028 0.050 0.451 0.310
mother’s occ class: 5 0.028 0.053 −0.104 0.414
mother’s occ class: 6 0.030 0.042 0.030 0.313
mother’s occ class: 7 0.055 0.044 −0.111 0.316
mother’s occ class: 9 0.022 0.047 −0.488∗ 0.285
mother’s occ class: 10 −0.003 0.034 0.099 0.256
‘nuclear family’ to 16 0.008 0.023 0.251∗ 0.136
mid 1990s −0.048∗∗∗ 0.010 0.073 0.046
late 1990s −0.068∗∗∗ 0.016 0.092 0.081
post 2000 −0.037 0.023 0.120 0.126
# observations 21256 21256
# individuals 2266 2266
R2 0.178 0.250
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual and robust.
‘nuclear family’ to 16 means lived with both natural parents from birth to age 16.
Reference categories: West Midlands, white, did not live with both natural parents to 16,
father/mother occupational class ‘plant/machine operative’. Occupational Class dummies:
(1) management, (2) professional, (3) associate professional/technical, (4) clerical/secretarial,
(5) craft and related, (6) personal/protective services, (7) sales, (9) other, (10) self-emp/unemp.